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Abstract
Patent-assertion entities (PAEs) are non-technology-practicing
companies that aggregate and license patents under threat of suit. Their
activities have drawn fire, including presidential condemnation, and
spurred proposed legislation to protect operating firms against them.
PAEs leverage flaws in the patent system to extort firms that
independently invent and sell technological goods to consumers. Since
PAEs tax innovators and appear to restrict rather than facilitate wealth
transfer to original patentees, their worst rent-seeking practices almost
certainly reduce net incentives to innovate and harm consumers. This
result is more likely if the principal desirable incentive that PAEs create
is to file patents rather than to commercialize technology.
The idiosyncratic nature of today’s patent system facilitates PAE
activity. Patents’ numerosity, vague scope, widespread invalidity, and
sometimes-functional claiming prevent even the most assiduous
technology companies from securing guaranteed clearing positions
before building products. These conditions ensure that a universe of
potentially infringed patents of dubious validity exists in many
industries ex post, especially in information technology. Fortunately,
atomized ownership of intellectual property limits enforcement ex post
because the unlikelihood of success in asserting few patents, the risk of
countersuit, and high litigation costs make suing a negative value
proposition. The result is a public-goods benefit in constrained
enforcement that ameliorates hold-up potential. Even ex post, owners of
disaggregated patents typically lack market power unless their
intellectual property rights are both likely valid and infringed.
PAE accumulation changes all of that. By amassing hundreds or
even thousands of patents, never building or selling goods, using shell
companies to conceal the contents of their portfolios, and asserting
patents in waves ex post, PAEs can realize immense hold-up power that
atomized owners lack. This conclusion holds true even if the great
majority of their patents are invalid or not infringed. Thus, many
operating victims are vulnerable to threats of incessant litigation and are
forced to pay tens or even hundreds of millions of dollars for licenses
that are unnecessary to engineer successful products. Commentators
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increasingly—though not universally—accept that PAEs harm the
economy. The solution, however, is less clear. Many propose reforming
the patent system, such as by requiring losing patentees to pay the other
side’s costs and forcing PAEs to disclose their portfolios. Some
legislative reforms appear likely, and in 2014 the Supreme Court
considered whether to invalidate certain computer-implemented
inventions. Nevertheless, modest changes are unlikely to provide a
significant remedy for PAE hold-up.
Lacking other means, some policy makers now look to antitrust law
for solutions. Not everyone believes that competition rules proscribe
PAE conduct or otherwise suitably constrain patent hold-up. Indeed,
antitrust rules are not a cure-all. This Article argues, however, that
antitrust law can viably limit certain abuses of the patent system by
PAEs. Section 2 of the Sherman Act proscribes monopolization and
Section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits asset acquisitions that may
substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly. These
provisions have sufficient teeth theoretically to catch the most egregious
forms of hold-up founded on ex post patent aggregation and assertion.
This Article explains how PAE activity can reduce social welfare and
how PAEs’ targeted patent aggregation and assertion may violate
competition rules.
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INTRODUCTION
The business world is abuzz about “patent trolls.”1 More formally
known as patent-assertion entities (PAEs), such companies amass and
1. See, e.g., William M. Bulkeley, Aggressive Patent Litigants Pose Growing Threat to
Big Business, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 14, 2005, 12:01 AM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB112666
647063840131.
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license intellectual property under threat of suit, but they do not build
technological goods for consumers.2 Their modus operandi is to eschew
ex ante technology-licensing markets where budding manufacturers of
future products seek useful know-how.3 They focus on the ex post
world where commercialized and potentially infringing goods already
exist.4 PAEs lie silently in wait for manufacturers to invent and build
valuable products, thus locking themselves into chosen technology.5
Only then do they threaten or file suit, holding up makers of popular,
and hence valuable, goods.6 From the perspective of independent
inventors whom PAEs approach, extravagant licensing demands based
on threat of suit may be reminiscent of extortion rackets that sell
protection against threats of their own creation.7
This phenomenon is possible due to shortcomings in today’s patent
regime. Ideally, one would see vibrant licensing markets that match
upstream inventors and downstream innovators who develop and
market technology.8 Such Coasian bargaining would diffuse know-how,
reward inventors with royalties tied to their insights’ incremental value
over next-best-available technologies, and grant engineers access to
cutting-edge knowledge in building the next generation of goods and
services.9 Sometimes this process occurs, especially in the
biopharmaceutical industries, but too often these ideal attributes are
unobtainable.10 In settings ranging from telecommunications to
2. Colleen V. Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The Complex Patent Ecosystem
and Its Implications for the Patent System, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 297, 300 (2010) (coining the term
“patent-assertion entity” to refer to “entities that use patents primarily to get licensing fees rather
than to support the development or transfer of technology” and explaining PAEs’ role within the
patent system).
3. See id. See generally FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE:
ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE AND REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION 31–72 (2011) [hereinafter FTC,
EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE] (discussing ex ante and ex post patent transactions).
4. See FTC, EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE, supra note 3, at 50 (illustrating a situation
where a firm has “invested in creating, developing or commercializing the patented technology”
but “needs the ex post license to avoid liability even if it invented the technology independent of
the patentee because patent infringement is a strict liability offense”).
5. See Niels J. Melius, Note, Trolling for Standards: How Courts and the Administrative
State Can Help Deter Patent Holdup and Promote Innovation, 15 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.
161, 171 (2012).
6. See generally Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking,
85 TEX. L. REV. 1991 (2007) (explaining the economics of a patent hold-up and its
consequences).
7. See Victoria E. Luxardo, Comment, Towards a Solution to the Problem of Illegitimate
Patent Enforcement Practices in the United States: An Equitable Affirmative Defense of “Fair
Use” in Patent, 20 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 791, 800 (2006).
8. See FTC, EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE, supra note 3, at 32–45, 48.
9. See id.; see also Anna B. Laakmann, An Explicit Policy Lever for Patent Scope, 19
MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 43, 50–51 (2012).
10. See Jay P. Kesan, Transferring Innovation, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2169, 2195 (2009).
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financial services and in all manner of computer-implemented
technologies, patents are not often the principal or even material driver
of innovation.11
The reasons for this unfortunate state of affairs are partially
structural. For many products, such as those in the informationtechnology (IT) industry, one must combine numerous distinct
technologies to create an end product.12 Because many of these are
patent-eligible, a vast universe of intellectual property rights (IPRs)
exists. For instance, RPX Corp. has estimated that more than a quarter
million patents read on smartphones alone.13 These factors, combined
with rapid incremental innovation, competition-induced incentives to
invent, lax disclosure requirements for obtaining a patent, vague claim
language, limited scrutiny by the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO),
and an overwhelmingly large field of prior art, render an efficient patent
regime unrealistic in the software industry.14 Most importantly, many—
perhaps most—patents are invalid.15 This is especially true of many
computer-implemented and business-method patents that could not
withstand scrutiny under Bilski v. Kappos,16 and of those using broad
functional claiming that the prior art likely anticipates or renders
obvious.17

11. See, e.g., Stuart J.H. Graham et al., High Technology Entrepreneurs and the Patent
System: Results of the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1255, 1262, 1279,
1292–94 (2009); see also Daniel R. Cahoy, An Incrementalist Approach to Patent Reform
Policy, 9 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 587, 604–05 (2006). See generally Mark A. Lemley,
The Myth of the Sole Inventor, 110 MICH. L. REV. 709, 750–52 (2012) (finding that inventors
discover almost all significant new technologies simultaneously and concluding that, under an
incentive-to-invent rationale for the patent system, society should grant far fewer patents).
12. See Brian Kahin, Patents and Diversity in Innovation, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH.
L. REV. 389, 390 (2007).
13. RPX CORP., REGISTRATION STATEMENT (FORM S-1) 59 (2011), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1509432/000119312511240287/ds1.htm.
14. See, e.g., Jonathan S. Masur, Regulating Patents, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 275, 282; John
S. Leibovitz, Note, Inventing a Nonexclusive Patent System, 111 YALE L.J. 2251, 2285 (2002);
see also Saul Levmore, Essay, The Impending iPrize Revolution in Intellectual Property Law,
93 B.U. L. REV. 139, 155 (2013). See generally Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers
in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1619–24 (2003) (describing the innovation characteristics
of the software industry and the property rights implications of cumulative innovation).
15. See John R. Allison et al., Patent Quality and Settlement Among Repeat Patent
Litigants, 99 GEO. L.J. 677, 687 & tbl.3 (2011); Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent
Cases—An Empirical Peek Inside the Black Box, 99 MICH. L. REV. 365, 385 (2000); see also
John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated Patents, 26
AIPLA Q.J. 185, 205 (1998); Mark A. Lemley, An Empirical Study of the Twenty-Year Patent
Term, 22 AIPLA Q.J. 369, 420 (1994).
16. 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
17. See Mark A. Lemley, Software Patents and the Return of Functional Claiming, 2013
WIS. L. REV. 905, 912.
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Consequently, technology companies cannot secure guaranteed
clearing positions in designing tomorrow’s products.18 This holds true
even though the great majority of innovation taking place at the
product-design level is independent.19 Copying is the exception rather
than the norm.20 Firms ameliorate the systemic patent threat by
constructing defensive IPR portfolios,21 cross-licensing,22 joining patent
pools,23 eliciting the services of defensive patent-buying funds,24 and
purchasing licenses to valuable asserted IPRs ex ante. They generally
ignore other patents in the design process to avoid future allegations of
willful infringement.25 This conduct is an imperfect solution, not least
because some ex post lawsuits are inevitable, and patentees suing ex
post can extract greater royalties than they would ex ante due to
irreversible investment. It also denies some deserving inventors their
due reward. Nevertheless, the state of affairs is workable to the extent
that patentees in the ex post world have market power that does not
materially surpass the power that they possessed in the ex ante world.
This typically occurs where patents are disaggregated26 and, potentially
more often, where they lie in the hands of operating companies that are
vulnerable to countersuit.27
18. See Edith Ramirez & Lisa Kimmel, A Competition Policy Perspective on Patent Law:
The Federal Trade Commission’s Report on the Evolving IP Marketplace, ANTITRUST SOURCE,
Aug. 2011, at 1, 4, available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/
antitrust_source/aug11_fullsource.authcheckdam.pdf.
19. See Christopher A. Cotropia & Mark A. Lemley, Copying in Patent Law, 87 N.C. L.
REV. 1421, 1424 & n.3 (2009).
20. Id. at 1424.
21. See Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d. 901, 917 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (Posner,
J., by designation), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 757 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
22. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROMOTING INNOVATION AND COMPETITION 59–64 (2007),
available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/hearings/ip/222655.pdf.
23. See id. at 64–66.
24. See Allen W. Wang, Rise of the Patent Intermediaries, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 159,
171–77 (2010).
25. See Mark A. Lemley, Ignoring Patents, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 19, 21–22.
26. But see infra Part III.
27. See Robert P. Greenspoon & Catherine M. Cottle, Don’t Assume a Can Opener:
Confronting Patent Economic Theories with Licensing and Enforcement Reality, 12 COLUM.
SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 194, 195 (2011). One should not, however, exaggerate the countersuit
threat as a constraint on patent assertion by operating companies. This is especially so given the
increasing prevalence of so-called “privateering” arrangements in which such firms bypass that
constraint. See Mark S. Popofsky & Michael D. Laufert, Patent Assertion Entities and Antitrust:
Operating Company Patent Transfers, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Apr. 2013, at 1, 1, available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust_source/apr13_full_source.authc
heckdam.pdf; see also Tom Ewing, Practical Considerations in the Indirect Deployment of
Intellectual Property Rights by Corporations and Investors, 4 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 109,
111–15 (2012).
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Even when firms have sunk capital into their marketed product lines,
several attributes cabin atomized patentees’ ability to hold up such
technology implementers. The likelihood of an invalidity or noninfringement finding and the cost of litigation make bringing suit a
negative value proposition except when the patent is strong.28
Furthermore, if the patentee is a practicing entity, filing an action would
likely attract an infringement countersuit.29 The result is a public-goods
benefit in less than complete ex post patent enforcement. This state of
affairs is relatively desirable due to independent invention.30 Although
patented technology is an input in the design and manufacturing
process, it is unlike physical inputs needed to build goods in the brickand-mortar world. A technology firm can ask its engineers to solve a
technical problem in designing a complex product, but a car producer
cannot avoid purchasing metal. This difference matters. In a world of
imperfect patent rights and high transaction costs, some patents should
remain unenforced.
This reality is relatively desirable, but it is not optimal. The factors
that constrain ex post market power by patentees also prevent some
inventors of novel, useful, and nonobvious technologies from deriving a
pecuniary sum befitting the nature of their insights. In the absence of
copying, though, this shortcoming is modest. Insightful inventions with
lucrative applications produce strong patents. Their enforcement, even
in a disaggregated state, will often be a positive value proposition. In
other words, strong patents will likely not be underenforced. For the
majority of patents, however, the social-welfare calculus is different.
These IPRs tax independent invention, and the net effect of that tax is
negative. The norm today is clean-room invention—so pervasively so
that most infringement complaints today do not even allege copying.31
If patent policy concerns itself with maximizing social welfare,
particularly by spurring the creation and commercialization of new
technologies, then it must do more than simply incentivize the filing of
28. See Fiona M. Scott Morton & Carl Shapiro, Strategic Patent Acquisitions, 79
ANTITRUST L.J. 463, 485 (2014), available at http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/shapiro/pae.pdf
(“[I]f the patents have a high likelihood of being invalid or not infringed, the individual inventor
may not find it profitable to initiate litigation to attempt to force potential licensees to pay
royalties.”); see also Edward Van Gieson & Paul Stellman, Killing Good Patents to Wipe Out
Bad Patents: Bilski, the Evolution of Patentable Subject Matter Rules, and the Inability to Save
Valuable Patents Using the Reissue Statute, 27 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J.
403, 418 (2011).
29. See Greenspoon & Cottle, supra note 27, at 195, 217 n.58.
30. See Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest for the Trolls, 113
COLUM. L. REV. 2117, 2122 (2013). See generally Samson Vermont, Independent Invention as a
Defense to Patent Infringement, 105 MICH. L. REV. 475, 478–80 (2006) (discussing independent
invention in patent law).
31. See Cotropia & Lemley, supra note 19, at 1424.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2016

7

Florida Law Review, Vol. 67, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 15

782

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67

patents. Insights described in a published government document do not
of themselves produce realizable gains;32 marketed goods and services
embodying these insights do.
PAEs leverage these flaws in the patent system to amass and assert
otherwise unenforced IPRs to hold up companies that have
independently invented and are already marketing the claimed
technologies.33 This practice leads many to conclude that PAEs harm
social welfare.34 Unsurprisingly, PAEs contest this characterization,
arguing that their aggregation strategies create an otherwise nonexistent
market for individual inventors.35 They justify their business model by
claiming that it solves a real, though modest, shortcoming of the
contemporary patent regime: a limited market for the sale of patent
licenses. For instance, Intellectual Ventures, a prominent PAE, claims to
have invented a new technology market aimed at covering an
“inevitable Invention Gap™” that occurs in “today’s fast-paced, hightech world—where companies are entering new markets and building
products that contain upwards of thousands of patented inventions.”36
Ultimately, the patent-troll problem is well known, but no
comprehensive solution has emerged because the phenomenon is
difficult to address within the framework of existing law. PAEs realize
value for their investors and the original patentees from whom they
acquire IPRs. Any larger problems are arguably a function of the
legislative framework and patent milieu within which PAEs exist. In
much the same way that intelligent tax planning is lawful even when it
conflicts with the policy rationale underlying the tax code, PAEs’
patent-infringement suits might reflect the alienability, enforcement,
and other property-right characteristics that Congress vested upon

32. See, e.g., FTC, EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE, supra note 3, at 9.
33. See Jason Schultz & Jennifer M. Urban, Protecting Open Innovation: The Defensive
Patent License as a New Approach to Patent Threats, Transaction Costs, and Tactical
Disarmament, 26 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 7 (2012).
34. See, e.g., Amy L. Landers, Let the Games Begin: Incentives to Innovation in the New
Economy of Intellectual Property Law, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 307, 345–46 (2006); Gerard N.
Magliocca, Blackberries and Barnyards: Patent Trolls and the Perils of Innovation, 82 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1809, 1810 (2007); Robert P. Merges, The Trouble with Trolls: Innovation, RentSeeking, and Patent Law Reform, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1583 (2009) (discussing how patent
trolls inhibit innovation, which fails to serve the social goal of the patent system and creates a need
to reform the current patent system); Henry C. Su, Invention Is Not Innovation and Intellectual
Property Is Not Just Like Any Other Form of Property: Competition Themes from the FTC’s
March 2011 Patent Report, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Aug. 2011, at 1, 4–5, available at http://www.am
ericanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust_source/aug11_su_7_26f.authcheckdam.pdf.
35. See infra note 86 and accompanying text.
36. How It Works, INTELLECTUAL VENTURES, http://www.intellectualventures.com/index.php/li
cense/licensing-overview (last visited Feb. 25, 2015).
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patents,37 even if enforcement of those rights inhibits net innovation and
harms consumers.
Proposed antitrust solutions may appear unconvincing, in part
because PAEs aggressively assert that they aggregate complementary,
rather than substitutable, patents.38 Moreover, it can be challenging to
define an antitrust prohibition that targets only the precise
characteristics that render PAEs subversive of innovation. This is
because many important innovators such as universities, startups, and
semiconductor-design houses share certain characteristics of PAEs—
they do not manufacture technology goods and sometimes sue to
vindicate their patent rights.39 The solutions to date are instead modest
and incremental, such as denying injunctive relief in cases of ex post
hold-up,40 limiting the entire-market-value rule,41 jettisoning the twentyfive-percent rule of thumb for reasonable royalty calculations,42 and
determining damages by reference to hypothetical ex ante licensing
agreements.43 Private-ordering solutions in the form of defensive patent
aggregators have also emerged.44 These efforts, although welcome,
remain incomplete.
This Article studies the economics of targeted patent aggregation
and assertion by non-practicing entities (NPEs) and shows that the
scrutinized behavior likely harms efficiency. It then explores the
possibility that PAE hold-up implicates the antitrust laws and concludes
that it does.45 Appealing to the characteristics of a hypothetical industry
subject to zero litigation costs and perfect information, the Article
explains that patent aggregators could actually create value through
37. E.g., 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2012) (“[P]atents shall have the attributes of personal
property.”).
38. See Daniel A. Crane, Intellectual Liability, 88 TEX. L. REV. 253, 286 (2009)
(observing that PAEs typically “aggregate portfolios of patents that are . . ., at most,
complements,” thus concluding that “[p]atent trolls usually do not possess market power in a
strong sense” and that “their aggregation does not confer market power in an antitrust sense”).
39. See FTC, EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE, supra note 3, at 8 n.5; see also Mark A.
Lemley, Are Universities Patent Trolls?, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 611
(2008) (asserting that universities share some characteristics with patent trolls).
40. E.g., eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 393–94 (2006).
41. See LaserDynamics, Inc. v. Quanta Computer, Inc., 694 F.3d 51, 67–70 (Fed. Cir.
2012).
42. Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
43. Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1324–25 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
44. See FTC, EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE, supra note 3, at 66–67.
45. Some commentators are skeptical that antitrust is an appropriate tool with which to
address PAE activity. See, e.g., Crane, supra note 38, at 286; Justin R. Orr, Patent Aggregation:
Models, Harms, and the Limited Role of Antitrust, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 525, 554 (2013);
Joshua Wright, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, What Role Should Antitrust Play in Regulating the
Activities of Patent Assertion Entities? 16–17 (Apr. 17, 2013), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/defa
ult/files/documents/public_statements/what-role-should-antitrust-play-regulating-activities-patent-asserti
on-entities/130417paespeech.pdf (arguing that patent and contract law best address PAE activity).
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blanket licensing, particularly by ameliorating Cournot-complement,
royalty-stacking problems while remaining subject to competition in the
form of direct licenses from underlying patentees. In the real world,
however, ex post under enforcement at the individual patentee level
obscures the economic distinction between substitutable and
complementary patents. The economics of modern patenting behavior in
technology industries explain why PAEs vastly magnify the market
power that IT patents bestow at the individual level, notwithstanding a
lack of technological overlap between IP rights in a given portfolio.
These insights lead to a remarkable and thus-far unnoticed parallel:
the U.S. Supreme Court’s landmark opinion in Broadcast Music, Inc. v.
CBS, Inc.46 sheds light on many of the issues at play in trolling
activity.47 As PAEs magnify market power by combining patents that
read on marketed devices while eliminating any prospect of direct
licensing between downstream manufacturers and upstream patentassignors, their activities may fail scrutiny under Sections 1–2 of the
Sherman Act and under Section 7 of the Clayton Act. The rationale and
sound precedential basis for this antitrust condemnation would
simultaneously inoculate NPEs that serve a valuable economic function
by engaging in ex ante technology transfer.
Part I introduces the PAE phenomenon. Criticism of “patent trolling”
now exists across the political spectrum; nevertheless, a raucous debate
is underway between policy makers and academics concerning the
effects of NPEs’ patent assertion on innovation and competition. After
placing the PAE debate in context, Part I addresses the critical
distinction between ex ante and ex post licensing. Observing that the
economics of the patent system are so complex that one cannot infer
that all patent accumulation and enforcement is inherently problematic,
Part II outlines a series of hypothetical worlds in which competition
variously flourishes with and without blanket or other forms of
licensing by poolers of IPRs. This Article then explains how today’s
patent-licensing markets actually operate. That discussion expounds a
theory of anticompetitive effect associated with PAE behavior. Part III
adopts this theory and applies it to substantive antitrust law to explore
viable limits on PAE hold-up.
I. PAES AND THE ECONOMICS OF PATENT LICENSING
This Part proceeds in three Sections. The first outlines typical PAE
behavior and the opposition mounting against it. The second Section
explores a healthier model for the relationship between patent assertion
46. 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
47. See id. at 6; see also Thomas J. Horton, Robert H. Lande, Should the Internet Exempt
the Media Sector from the Antitrust Laws?, 65 FLA. L. REV. 1521, 1537–38 (2013) (describing
the “one-stop shop[] concept” that the Supreme Court applied in Broadcast Music).
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and independent innovation. The third Section presents a competitive
baseline for measuring the efficiency of outcomes in order to explain
the relative efficiency of concentrated and atomized patent ownership.
A. The Rise and Possible Fall of the “Patent Troll”
Patent trolls have triggered a firestorm of protest that may be
reaching a crescendo. Leading technology firms condemn PAEs’ rentseeking behavior,48 and countless newspaper articles criticize patent
aggregation and assertion.49 The President has opined that PAEs “don’t
actually produce anything themselves. They’re just trying to essentially
leverage and hijack somebody else’s idea and see if they can extort
some money out of them.”50 The Chief Judge of the Federal Circuit has
referred to their business model as patent trolling.51
PAEs typically buy patents that would otherwise lie dormant on
account of their probable invalidity, vague scope, and age.52 After
amassing an arsenal of such IPRs, they hold up businesses that
independently invent and market technological products that consumers

48. See, e.g., Comments of Google, Blackberry, Earthlink & Red Hat to the Federal Trade
Commission and U.S. Department of Justice on Patent Assertion Entities (Apr. 5, 2013),
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/workshops/pae/comments/paew-0049.pdf;
Congress Must Rein in “Terrorist” Patent Trolls, Say Senior Executives, MLEX, Mar. 14, 2013
(subscription required); David Ingram, Corporate Counsel Push Antitrust Response to Patent
Trolls, THOMSON REUTERS, Mar. 15, 2013 (subscription required).
49. See, e.g., Stephanie Kirchgaessner, Patent Wars Unite US Left and Right, FIN.
TIMES (Oct. 17, 2013, 12:14 AM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/cfe0736e-2a9f-11e3-8fb800144feab7de.html#axzz3HPjTUoA9 (subscription required); Floyd Norris, Extracting a Toll
from a Patent “Troll,” N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/18/business/extrac
ting-a-toll-from-a-patent-troll.html; Patent Reform in America: Trolls on the Hill, ECONOMIST
(Dec. 7, 2013), http://www.economist.com/news/business/21591206-congress-takes-aim-patentabusers-trolls-hill; David Segal, Has Patent, Will Sue: An Alert to Corporate America, N.Y.
TIMES (July 13, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/14/business/has-patent-will-sue-analert-to-corporate-america.html; see also Ashby Jones, Patent ‘Troll’ Tactics Spread, WALL ST.
J. (July 8, 2012, 8:46 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014240527023032922045
77514782932390996.
50. Gene Sperling, Taking on Patent Trolls to Protect American Innovation, WHITE
HOUSE BLOG (June 4, 2013, 1:55 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2013/06/04/takingpatent-trolls-protect-american-innovation (quoting President Barack Obama’s February 14, 2013
“Fireside Hangout”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
51. Randall R. Rader, Colleen V. Chien & David Hricik, Make Patent Trolls Pay in
Court, N.Y. TIMES (June 4, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/05/opinion/make-patenttrolls-pay-in-court.html.
52. See, e.g., Mark Liang & Brian Berliner, Fee Shifting in Patent Litigation, 18 VA. J.L.
& TECH. 59, 94 (2013); Mark Liang, The Aftermath of TS Tech: The End of Forum Shopping in
Patent Litigation and Implications for Non-Practicing Entities, 19 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 29,
34 (2010); Jennifer Kahaulelio Gregory, Comment, The Troll Next Door, 6 J. MARSHALL REV.
INTELL. PROP. L. 292, 295 (2007).
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value.53 The cost of litigation, uncertainty as to the outcome of judicial
proceedings, and a nearly endless supply of patents available to PAEs
induce many, perhaps most, innovators to settle for large amounts of
money.54 This Article demonstrates that PAEs routinely extract far
greater royalties than the economically optimal amount.
An Intel executive coined the expression “patent troll” in 2001 to
characterize these practices,55 which bear “indicia of extortion.”56 Since
then, the problem of offensive patent assertion by NPEs has become
increasingly acute. Between 2010 and 2012, the percentage of all
patent-infringement lawsuits that PAEs brought rose from 29% to
62%.57 The America Invents Act, which limited joinder,58 introduced
post-grant review,59 and bolstered inter partes review,60 may bear some
responsibility for this uptick.61 Regardless, NPEs now file a majority of
all patent-infringement suits, and the scale of PAE activity has risen
sharply.62
In most cases, PAEs do not actually need to file suit to extract
lucrative sums. In 2012, for instance, PAEs may have threatened more
than 100,000 firms with such proceedings.63 An influential study—
albeit one criticized for not estimating efficiency losses and for loosely
defining NPEs—estimates that NPEs imposed $29 billion of direct costs
on U.S. businesses in 2011 alone.64 Interestingly, when they prevail at
53. See, e.g., Brad A. Greenberg, Copyright Trolls and Presumptively Fair Uses, 85 U.
COLO. L. REV. 53, 77–79 (2014); Sarah R. Wasserman Rajec, Tailoring Remedies to Spur
Innovation, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 733, 744 (2012).
54. See, e.g., Phil Goldberg, Policy Brief, Stumping Patent Trolls on the Bridge to
Innovation, PROGRESSIVE POLICY INST. 5–7 (Oct. 2013), http://www.progressivepolicy.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/09/10.2013-Goldberg_Stumping-Patent-Trolls-On-The-Bridge-To-Innova
tion.pdf.
55. Todd Klein, Comment, eBay v. MercExchange and KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc.:
The Supreme Court Wages War Against Patent Trolls, 112 PENN ST. L. REV. 295, 296 (2007).
56. See Eon-Net LP v. Flagstar Bancorp, 653 F.3d 1314, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
57. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, PATENT ASSERTION AND U.S. INNOVATION 1, 5
(2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/patent_report.pdf.
58. 35 U.S.C. § 299 (2012).
59. Id. § 321.
60. Id. § 311.
61. See, e.g., David J. Kappos, Facts Show Patent Trolls Not Behind Rise in Suits,
LAW360 (Jan. 15, 2014, 12:39 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/501142/facts-show-patenttrolls-not-behind-rise-in-suits (subscription required); Adam Mossoff, GAO Report on Patent
Litigation Confirms No “Patent Troll” Litigation Problem, TRUTH ON MARKET (Dec. 17, 2013),
http://truthonthemarket.com/2013/12/17/gao-report-on-patent-litigation-confirms-no-patent-troll
-litigation-problem/.
62. See, e.g., James Bessen, ALL the Facts: PAEs Are Suing Many More Companies,
PATENTLY-O (Jan. 28, 2014), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2014/01/facts-suing-companies.html.
63. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 57, at 1, 6.
64. James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, Essay, The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes, 99
CORNELL L. REV. 387, 389 (2014). For criticism, see David L. Schwartz & Jay P. Kesan,

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol67/iss2/15

12

Devlin: Antitrust Limits on Targeted Patent Aggregation

2015]

ANTITRUST LIMITS ON TARGETED PATENT AGGREGATION

787

trial, PAEs tend to win larger damages amounts than practicing
companies.65 NPEs enjoy a lower success rate, however, at trial. A 2011
study concluded that NPEs won only 9.2% of cases litigated to
judgment (including default judgments) compared to the approximately
40% success rate that practicing entities achieve at trial (not including
default judgments).66 Once an NPE files suit, it receives an award just
24% of the time.67 These facts suggest that, on average, PAEs assert
weaker patents.68 Of course, PAEs are likely to handpick the best IPRs
from their larger portfolios to assert in court.69 Thus, these statistics
suggest that PAEs often—though perhaps not always—aggregate
weaker than average patents.
The growing scale of PAE assertion reflects the lucrative nature of
the business model and the ease of entry into the business.70 The fuel
that sustains PAE assertion is an enormous universe of unenforced
patents, which is disproportionately comprised of computerimplemented and business-method claims.71 Because IT products
Analyzing the Role of Non-Practicing Entities in the Patent System, Essay, 99 CORNELL L. REV.
425, 431–33 (2014).
65. Lemley & Melamed, supra note 30, at 2119–20.
66. Allison et al., supra note 15, at 693 tbl.8 & fig.4, 694.
67. See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, 2013 PATENT LITIGATION STUDY: BIG CASES MAKE
HEADLINES, WHILE PATENT CASES PROLIFERATE—1995–2012, at 5 (2013), http://www.pwc.com/en_US/us
/forensic-services/publications/assets/2013-patent-litigation-study.pdf.
68. See, e.g., Lemley & Melamed, supra note 30, at 2120; Arti K. Rai, Improving
(Software) Patent Quality Through the Administrative Process, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 503, 505
(2013). But see David L. Schwartz & Jay P. Kesan, Essay, Analyzing the Role of Non-Practicing
Entities in the Patent System, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 425, 451 (2014) (“There is some evidence
that NPEs settle more quickly compared to other patent holders, which could indicate the
possibility of nuisance settlements. . . . But there is also empirical evidence that the patents
asserted by NPEs are similar to patents asserted by practicing entities.”).
69. See, e.g., J.P. Mello, Technology Licensing and Patent Trolls, 12 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH.
L. 388, 394–95 (2006); cf. Malcolm T. “Ty” Meeks & Charles A. Eldering, Patent Valuation:
Aren’t We Forgetting Something? Making the Case for Claims Analysis in Patent Valuation by
Proposing a Patent Valuation Method and a Patent-Specific Discount Rate Using the CAPM, 9
NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 194, 203 (2010) (opining that, as a general matter, “the strongest
patents are less likely to make it into the litigation data pool” and that “[i]n contrast, patents with
value just below the strongest of patents may find themselves in litigation more often”).
70. See, e.g., Jack Ellis, A Game of Scale, INTELL. ASSET MGMT., July/Aug. 2012, at 2, 2,
available at http://acaciaresearch.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/IAM_54-Acacia_digital.pdf
(observing that Acacia Research, a PAE, has been “a runway success. In just three-and-a-half
years, its market cap has shot up from around US$90 million to a staggering US$1.75 billion”);
Pascal-Emmanuel Gobry, Intellectual Ventures Generated $700 Million in Revenues in 2010,
BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 7, 2011, 5:32 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/intellectual-ventures2010-revenue-2011-3.
71. See David A. Fitzgerald II, Saving Alternative Dispute Resolution in Patent Law:
Countering the Effects of the Patent Troll Revolution, 23 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 345, 348–
49 (2008); Anna Mayergoyz, Note, Lessons from Europe on How to Tame U.S. Patent Trolls, 42
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 241, 259–60 (2009).
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combine thousands of discrete and potentially patent-eligible
components, IT manufacturers are particularly vulnerable.72 Some
commentators estimate that over two million patents are presently active
in the United States.73 Smartphone patents account for nearly 12% of
them.74 These features of today’s system, coupled with the risk of treble
damages for willful infringement,75 make it infeasible for innovators to
scour the prior art and to secure clearing positions before marketing
next-generation devices.76 A recent paper estimated that it would take
two million patent attorneys working full time to compare every
software patent issued in a year to every firm’s products, costing $400
billion—almost twice the value of the software industry.77
Two factors are disproportionately responsible for this phenomenon.
The first is a 1998 decision from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit, State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial
Group.78 In State Street, the Federal Circuit held that software and
business methods are patent-eligible if they produce “a useful, concrete
and tangible result.”79 That holding, combined with the “dot.com boom”
that soon followed, resulted in the PTO’s issuance of a deluge of such
patents.80 To make matters worse, examiners often failed to scrutinize
the prior art surrounding such applications, causing many obvious or
non-novel patents to issue.81 Compounding the problem, the Federal

72. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 39, at 613.
73. E.g., Dennis Crouch, How Many US Patents Are In-Force?, PATENTLY-O (May 4,
2012), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2012/05/how-many-us-patents-are-in-force.html (calculating
that about 2.1 million U.S. patents were in force as of May 1, 2012).
74. See RPX CORP., supra note 13.
75. The Federal Circuit, however, has ameliorated the risk of willful infringement when
an innovator merely happens to see a patent before manufacturing what later transpires to be an
infringing product. See In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
76. See, e.g., Kevin R. Davidson, Retooling Patents: Current Problems, Proposed
Solutions, and Economic Implications for Patent Reform, 8 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 425, 454
(2008).
77. Christina Mulligan & Timothy B. Lee, Scaling the Patent System, 68 N.Y.U. ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 289, 304–05 (2012).
78. 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
79. Id. at 1373, 1375 (quoting In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1994),
abrogated by In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008), aff’d sub nom. Bilski v. Kappos, 130
S. Ct. 3218 (2010)).
80. See, e.g., Andrea Lynn Evensen, Comment, “Don’t Let the Sun Go Down on Me”: An
In-Depth Look at Opportunistic Business Method Patent Licensing and a Proposed Solution to
Allow Small-Defendant Business Method Users to Sing a Happier Tune, 37 J. MARSHALL L.
REV. 1359, 1364 (2004).
81. See, e.g., Katherine J. Strandburg, What If There Were a Business Method Use
Exemption to Patent Infringement?, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 245, 262 (citing sources for the
proposition that the “low patent quality for business method patents may have resulted from
PTO inexperience with the subject matter of business method patents, from the inaccessibility to
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Circuit requires minimal disclosure for computer-implemented
inventions.82 Many software patents now claim methods far broader
than what their respective inventors actually invented, with several such
patents claimed in functional terms.83
These background conditions make large-scale patent aggregation
and ex post assertion possible. As noted, the public backlash against
what many perceive to be increasingly objectionable behavior by PAEs
is growing loud. However, PAEs have not sat idly by in the face of this
public criticism,84 nor are they bereft of support, as some commentators
have sought to justify offensive patent assertion by NPEs.85 PAEs claim
to build fluid technology-transfer markets by providing the necessary
resources to assert deserving patents whose original owners could not
afford to monetize them and by connecting those upstream inventions to
their downstream uses.86 Part II of this Article scrutinizes that
justification and finds it wanting.
More generally, PAEs undermine their claim to legitimacy by
engaging in questionable practices, including those that hinder
transparency. Some PAEs positively invest in secrecy, a phenomenon
most plausibly explained by an attempt to magnify hold-up of
independent inventors and marketers of technology.87 For instance,
examiners of business method prior art due to its relatively recent patentability, and from an
overly relaxed nonobviousness standard”).
82. See DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS
CAN SOLVE IT 120–21 (2009).
83. See Lemley, supra note 17.
84. See, e.g., Michelle Quinn, ‘Patent Trolls’ Launch a Lobbying Defense in D.C.,
POLITICO (Oct. 1, 2013, 5:05 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2013/10/patent-trolls-launcha-lobbying-defense-in-dc-97592.html.
85. See, e.g., James F. McDonough III, Comment, The Myth of the Patent Troll: An
Alternative View of the Function of Patent Dealers in an Idea Economy, 56 EMORY L.J. 189,
190 (2006); Sannu K. Shrestha, Note, Trolls or Market-Makers? An Empirical Analysis of
Nonpracticing Entities, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 114, 150 (2010).
86. See, e.g., About Us, ACACIA RESEARCH CORP., http://acaciaresearch.com/about-us/
(last visited Feb. 25, 2015) (“An intermediary in the patent market, Acacia facilitates efficiency
and delivers monetary rewards to the patent owner.”); FAQ, INTELLECTUAL VENTURES,
http://www.intellectualventures.com/about/faq (last visited Feb. 25, 2015) (“Our mission is to energize
and streamline the invention economy while producing a financial return for our investors.”); Our
Services, CONVERSANT INTELLECTUAL PROP. MGMT., http://www.conversantip.com/our-services/ (last
visited Feb. 25, 2015) (formerly Mosaid Technologies) (“We’re in the business of making
innovation more rewarding. Through our IP management services, sophisticated partnership
models and innovative programs, we help our global partners realize the full value from their IP
assets.”); What We Do, IPNAV, http://www.ipnav.com/what-we-do/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2015)
(“IPNav’s integrated, end-to-end solution turns idle IP assets into revenue streams. Using its
proprietary Patent Monetization Platform, IPNav unlocks the value trapped in our clients’ IP
portfolios . . . .”).
87. See, e.g., infra Subsection II.A.3.c.ii (exploring this phenomenon through a
hypothetical example).
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Intellectual Ventures has reportedly created more than 1300 shell
companies88 to mask patent acquisitions from unsuspecting operating
firms and, perhaps, to divorce the entities it uses to bring lawsuits from
the companies it uses to hold other IPRs.
For all the harm that PAEs inflict on large technology companies,
the last straw politically may have been their recent targeting of small
businesses and individuals.89 A prominent example is MPHJ
Technology Investments, a PAE that sent threatening letters to more
than 16,000 individuals and small businesses across America.90 The
conduct of MPHJ and other similar PAEs has triggered legislative
action at the state and federal level.
Significant movement is now underway to arrest the most egregious
PAE practices. In May 2013, Vermont became the first state to pass a
law targeting PAEs.91 Its “Bad Faith Assertions of Patent
Infringements” bill permits victims of illegitimate patent enforcement to
sue the firm that asserted that IPR and authorizes the state’s Attorney
General to bring civil actions against perceived trolls.92 In January
2014, New York’s Attorney General entered into a consent decree with
MPHJ.93 The decree, which followed on the heels of a lawsuit against
MPHJ by the Vermont Attorney General, prohibited the company from
using deceptive tactics against New York businesses.94 Under
investigation by the U.S. government but not content to stay on the
defensive, MPHJ boldly sued the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) on
January 13, 2014, in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of

88. See Tom Ewing & Robin Feldman, The Giants Among Us, 2012 S TAN . TECH. L.
R EV . 1, 2, https://journals.law.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/stanford-technology-lawreview-stlr/online/feldman-giants-among-us.pdf.
89. See, e.g., Jim Bessen, Op-Ed, How Patent Trolls Doomed Themselves by Targeting
Main Street, ARS TECHNICA (Sept. 12, 2013, 9:57 AM), http://arstechnica.com/techpolicy/2013/09/op-ed-how-patent-trolls-doomed-themselves-by-targeting-main-street/.
90. Jan Wolfe, Accused Patent Troll Takes Aim at FTC, Settles with N.Y. AG, AM. LAW.
(Jan. 14, 2014), available at http://www.litigationdaily.com/id=1202638423763
(LexisNexis subscription required).
91. See, e.g., Eric Goldman, Vermont Enacts the Nation’s First Anti-Patent Trolling Law,
FORBES (May 22, 2013, 2:22 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ericgoldman/2013/05/22/vermontenacts-the-nations-first-anti-patent-trolling-law/.
92. H. 299, 2013–2014 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 6 (Vt. 2013), VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9,
§§ 4195–99.
93. See Press Release, N.Y. State Office of the Att’y Gen., A.G. Schneiderman
Announces Groundbreaking Settlement with Abusive “Patent Troll,” (Jan. 14, 2014), available
at http://www.ag.ny.gov/press-release/ag-schneiderman-announces-groundbreaking-settlementabusive-“patent-troll”.
94. See id.; see also Dennis Crouch, State of Vermont’s Demand Letter Case Against
MPHJ Continues, PATENTLY-O (Aug. 12, 2014), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2014/08/vermontsagainst-continues.html.
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Texas, seeking declaratory relief that the FTC was violating MPHJ’s
constitutional right to enforce its patents.95
Several government studies of PAE activity exist. In 2011, the FTC
released a report concluding that “[e]ven if PAEs arguably encourage
invention, they can deter innovation by raising costs and risks without
making a technological contribution.”96 In summer 2013, the President
published a report making recommendations aimed at limiting PAE
hold-up.97 Later that year, the FTC announced a Section 6(b) study on
PAEs’ effects on innovation and competition.98 That action followed a
public workshop on PAE activity that the FTC held in conjunction with
the Justice Department’s Antitrust Division on December 10, 2012.99
On December 17, 2013, the Senate Judiciary Committee held a hearing
regarding “Protecting Small Businesses and Promoting Innovation by
Limiting Patent Troll Abuse.”100 Congress is presently weighing
legislative reform aimed at curbing the worst abuses. It may pass the
“Innovation Act,” which would increase transparency and award
prevailing defendants of patent-infringement suits their costs and
attorneys’ fees.101
The Supreme Court is also involved. The Court has issued at least
fifteen patent opinions since 2004.102 Many of those decisions limit
patent hold-up. The Court has limited the availability of injunctive
relief;103 made it easier to show that a claimed invention is obvious;104
held that a licensee has standing to challenge the validity and
infringement of a patent for which it pays royalties;105 clarified that
abstract inventions are unpatentable;106 found that a product or method
lacking an “inventive concept” does not claim patentable subject
95. Complaint at 2, 5, MPHJ Tech. Invs., LLC v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, No. 6:14-cv-11
(W.D. Tex. Jan. 13, 2014).
96. FTC, EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE, supra note 3, at 9.
97. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 57.
98. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Seeks to Examine Patent Assertion Entities
and Their Impact on Innovation, Competition (Sept. 27, 2013), available at http://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/press-releases/2013/09/ftc-seeks-examine-patent-assertion-entities-their-impact.
99. See Public Workshops: Patent Assertion Entity Activities, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.,
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/workshops/pae/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2015).
100. Hearing on Protecting Small Businesses and Promoting Innovation by Limiting Patent
Troll Abuse, 113th Cong. (2013), available at http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/
protecting-small-businesses-and-promoting-innovation-by-limiting-patent-troll-abuse.
101. Innovation Act, H.R. 3309, 113th Cong. § 3(b)(1), § 8(a)(1) (2013).
102. John W. Cox & Joseph Vandegrift, The Supreme Court Is Paying Attention to Patent
Law Again, LAW360 (Apr. 1, 2013), http://www.law360.com/articles/425426/the-supremecourt-is-paying-attention-to-patent-law-again.
103. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 392–93 (2006).
104. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007).
105. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 121–22, 137 (2007).
106. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3230 (2010).
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matter;107 clarified that a naturally occurring DNA sequence is
unpatentable;108 and held that patentees always have the burden of
persuasion to establish infringement, even when they defend a
declaratory-judgment action.109 In the 2014 Term, the Court issued an
important opinion holding that computer-implemented inventions based
on intermediated settlement are abstract and therefore patentineligible.110 Given the extent to which PAEs rely on software patents, a
ruling that materially cabins the patentability of such technologies could
undermine the threat that many PAEs pose to business.
Such reforms would certainly ameliorate PAE hold-up; however,
they would not be a panacea.111 This Article explores whether an
antitrust solution exists to counter the most extreme instances of PAE
hold-up. If such a solution exists, it would also be an additional measure
with which to counter large-scale, offensive patent aggregation. Such a
limitation would be particularly valuable to many of today’s most
successful technology firms, which the largest PAEs tend to target.
Nevertheless, legislative reform will not likely eliminate the threat that
such comprehensive patent aggregation and assertion can pose.
B. The Optimal Rate of Patent Assertion and Independent
Innovation
To understand the economics of patent aggregation, one must
appreciate how the contemporary patent regime operates. The system’s
essential features are well known. A patent’s defining characteristic is
the right to exclude.112 An inventor of a novel, useful, and nonobvious
technology who sufficiently discloses his insight receives a twenty-year
monopoly.113 This monopoly is rarely an economic one—enabling the
sustainable and profitable raising of prices above competitive
levels114—rather, it is an exclusive privilege to practice the claimed
invention.115 Most patents have little to no value because they claim just
one of many equally good alternatives to achieving a particular end or
because they read on a product or process for which there is little or no
107. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294 (2012).
108. See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2119–
20 (2013).
109. Medtronic, Inc. v. Mirowski Family Ventures, LLC, 134 S. Ct. 843, 846 (2014).
110. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2352 (2014).
111. See, e.g., Timothy B. Lee, There Are Two Patent Troll Problems. The House Bill Only Fixes
One of Them., WASH. POST (Dec. 4, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/theswitch/wp/2013/12/04/there-are-two-patent-troll-problems-the-house-bill-only-fixes-one-of-them/.
112. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2012).
113. See id. §§ 101–03, 154.
114. See Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 42–43 & 43 n.4 (2006).
115. See Andrew Chin, Research in the Shadow of DNA Patents, 87 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF. SOC’Y 846, 866 (2005).
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consumer demand.116 The owners of such patents lack market power
because if they raise price significantly above marginal cost, consumers
will be unwilling to pay for a license. Consequently, rightsholders have
only litigated 1.5% of patents.117
Two nuances shape the patent right. First, a patent does not grant an
absolute right to exclude as might exist if enforcement costs were equal
to zero or if the state policed infringement on patentees’ behalf. Instead,
patents grant their owners the ability to ask a court to order another to
stop practicing their inventions, to pay reasonable royalties, or (in the
event of willful infringement) to fork up treble damages.118 This
difference is important. The cost of litigating a patent to judgment
hovers between $5 million and $8 million,119 which makes filing suit a
loss-generating endeavor unless the exclusive right is sufficiently
valuable. Second, even assuming that patentees have the means and
inclination to enforce their rights, patents confer probabilistic rights to
exclude only.120 Although patents enjoy a statutory presumption of
validity,121 many of them are in fact invalid.122 This is primarily because
the PTO lacks the resources to scrutinize every application; thus, it
routinely errs.123 Empirical studies of validity show that courts strike
down approximately half of all patents litigated to judgment.124
These findings likely reflect selection bias because they apply to the
less than 2% of patents that are ever litigated to judgment.125 Whether
116. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE
LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 4, 20 ex. 8 (1995) [hereinafter IP LICENSING
GUIDELINES].
117. See John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley & Joshua Walker, Extreme Value or Trolls on
Top? The Characteristics of the Most-Litigated Patents, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 4 (2009).
118. 35 U.S.C. §§ 283–84 (2012).
119. See, e.g., STEVEN M. AUVIL & DAVID A. DIVINE, AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW
ASS’N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 2011, at 35; Xuan-Thao Nguyen, Dynamic
Federalism and Patent Law Reform, 85 IND. L.J. 449, 450 (2010); Wayne B. Paugh, The
Betrayal of Patent Reexamination: An Alternative to Litigation, Not a Supplement, 19 FED. CIR.
B.J. 177, 207 (2009).
120. See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 75, 75
(2005) (“[A] patent does not confer upon its owner the right to exclude but rather a right to try
to exclude by asserting the patent in court. When a patent holder asserts its patent against an
alleged infringer, the patent holder is rolling the dice.” (citation omitted)).
121. 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (2012).
122. See Doug Lichtman & Mark A. Lemley, Rethinking Patent Law’s Presumption of
Validity, 60 STAN. L. REV. 45, 48 (2007).
123. See id. at 47.
124. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 120, at 76; see also supra note 15.
125. See James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, Lessons for Patent Policy from Empirical
Research on Patent Litigation, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1, 3–6 (2005); Arti K. Rai, Allocating
Power over Fact-Finding in the Patent System, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 907, 920 (2004); see
also Shawn P. Miller, Where’s the Innovation: An Analysis of the Quantity and Qualities of
Anticipated and Obvious Patents, 18 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1, 19 (2013).
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the effect of any such bias means that the roughly 50% invalidity rate is
representative of the broader universe of patents is the subject of
debate.126 On one hand, parties are more likely to settle infringement
claims founded on the strongest patents, such that empirical studies of
IPRs subject to validity determinations may fail to account for high-end
patents. On the other hand, the weakest patents are also unlikely to
make it to a validity determination.127 Absent the PAE phenomenon
discussed in this Article or other strategic scenarios, firms are reluctant
to spend millions of dollars asserting demonstrably invalid patents.128
Furthermore, evidence shows that litigated patents are stronger on
average than non-litigated patents.129 Most recently, evidence has
emerged that the most litigated patents, usually asserted by PAEs, are
invalidated or held not infringed far more often than once-asserted
patents.130 Regardless, it is widely accepted that active patents are
subject to chronic rates of invalidity.131 This seems particularly true of
software patents that NPEs assert.132
Is this phenomenon a good thing? The fact that the patent system serves
an explicit constitutional mandate makes answering this question
conceptually feasible. Specifically, the law recognizes patents “[t]o promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times
to . . . Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective . . . Discoveries.”133
To judge the status quo, then, one might fruitfully ask whether less than
complete enforcement is attractive from the perspective of spurring
innovation. If (i) patents were valid and they disclosed cutting-edge
technology at the time of invention; (ii) search, identification, and
negotiation costs were absent; and (iii) the social and private costs of
litigation were zero, then the optimal rate of patent assertion would
indeed be 100%. However, the world operates differently today, which
complicates the analysis. Due to imperfections in the patent system, the

126. See Bessen & Meurer, supra note 125, at 5–6.
127. See Shrestha, supra note 85, at 143.
128. Id. at 120.
129. See John R. Allison et al., Valuable Patents, 92 GEO. L.J. 435, 439–40 (2004) (arguing
that “litigated patents tend to be much more valuable than others on average” and defining
valuable patents as “individual patents that produce substantial economic benefit to their
owners”).
130. See Allison et al., supra note 15, at 680, 687 tbl.3.
131. A 2006 study found that once courts consider validity, noninfringement, and
enforceability, “accused patent infringers have been winning patent infringement suits at a rate
of three to one.” Paul M. Janicke & LiLan Ren, Who Wins Patent Infringement Cases?, 34
AIPLA Q.J. 1, 3–4 (2006).
132. See Allison et al., supra note 15, at 680 (“NPEs and software patentees
overwhelmingly lose their cases, even with patents that they litigate again and again.”).
133. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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perfect rate of patent assertion is less than 100% (though, most
assuredly, greater than 0%).
To start, copying is unusual rather than typical.134 Only about 10%
of patent-infringement complaints even allege copying.135 This matters
because if downstream implementers of technology routinely
appropriate others’ inventions, then one could justify incomplete
enforcement based only on litigation costs and possible invalidity. Yet,
to the extent that independent invention is responsible for marketed
technology, limited patent enforcement offers public-goods benefits.136
Independent invention coming hot on the heels of a patent can suggest
that the claimed technology may have been obvious in light of the prior
act.137 An economic purpose of the § 103 condition is to deny protection
to inevitable inventions.138
In certain fields, patents often fail both to disclose technology in a
meaningful way and to percolate knowledge.139 Where a patent
document spurs no further action—that is, where the patentee does not
commercialize her technology or license it so that another can learn and
put that invention into practice—it does not advance the constitutional
foundation on which the patent system rests.140 To the extent that these
characteristics are present, underenforcement limits the “tax” effects of
patents on downstream innovation, which is the principal source of
social welfare.141
Less than total patent enforcement is desirable in certain industries.
Conceived in an age when, “if you put technology in a bag and shook it,
it would make some noise,”142 the patent regime now barely resembles
134. See Cotropia & Lemley, supra note 19, at 1424.
135. See id.
136. See INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A
GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 887 (Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman
eds., 2005).
137. See generally Peter E. Gratzinger, Was the Telescope Obvious? An Inquiry into
Simultaneous Invention, 13 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 71 (2011) (exploring whether
simultaneous invention suggests obviousness).
138. See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012) (providing that “[a] patent . . . may not be obtained . . . if
the . . . claimed invention . . . would have been obvious”). For this author’s larger discussion of
this point, see Alan Devlin & Neel Sukhatme, Self-Realizing Inventions and the Utilitarian
Foundation of Patent Law, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 897 (2009). See generally Tun-Jen Chiang,
A Cost-Benefit Approach to Patent Obviousness, 82 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 39, 42–56 (2008)
(discussing the history and development of the obviousness requirement for patentability).
139. See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz, The Uneasy Case for Patent Races over Auctions, 60
STAN. L. REV. 803, 839 n.140 (2007); Teresa M. Summers, Note, The Scope of Utility in the
Twenty-First Century: New Guidance for Gene-Related Patents, 91 GEO. L.J. 475, 489 (2003).
140. See FTC, EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE, supra note 3, at 9, 51.
141. See id. at 52–53 & n.13.
142. Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property
Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577, 585
(1999).
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its earlier incarnation. Gone are the days when a single patent covered a
larger machine. Today, electrical inventions account for the lion’s share
of patents coming out of the PTO,143 and the most litigated patents lie in
the fields of software and telecommunications.144 Mobile telephony is
by far the largest field of patenting, possibly accounting for as much as
one-quarter of all issued U.S. patents in 2013.145 These modern
developments have profound implications for how a patent system
initially designed for physical devices should accommodate very
different forms of invention.
Above all, innovation in industries like telecommunications, IT, and
semiconductors takes place at the level of discrete subcomponents that
one must combine in large numbers to create an end product.146 This
characteristic is of utmost importance because it triggers coordination
problems.147 Economists have long recognized that divided ownership
of complementary goods creates inefficiencies in the form of royalty
stacking or Cournot-complements effects.148 If the builder of a
telecommunications device must purchase 10,000 patents to avoid
infringement and a different firm owns each patent, then it must identify
the 10,000 relevant patents and their owners and conduct that many
separate negotiation sessions. Additionally, each patentee has an
incentive to hold out and to demand as the price of its blessing an
amount trivially less than the expected value of the device.149 As
discussed below, the Supreme Court tempered this danger in its 2006
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC decision, which made injunctive relief
in the event of holdout unlikely.150 Nevertheless, strategic behavior can
allow patentees to extract greater royalties than they could have
143. See Annette I. Kahler, Examining Exclusion in Woman-Inventor Patenting: A
Comparison of Educational Trends and Patent Data in the Era of Computer Engineer Barbie®,
19 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 773, 788 & 789 fig.3 (2011).
144. See Allison et al., supra note 117, at 3.
145. See CHETAN SHARMA, MOBILE PATENTS LANDSCAPE: AN IN-DEPTH QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS
5 (2d ed. 2013), available at http://www.chetansharma.com/MobilePatentsLandscape_2013.htm.
146. See Kahin, supra note 12, at 390; see also WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., WORLD
PATENT REPORT: A STATISTICAL REVIEW F.1 tbl.1 (2008), available at http://www.wipo.int/
ipstats/en/statistics/patents/wipo_pub_931.html#f1 (noting a larger number of patent
applications in these categories).
147. See, e.g., Rudy Santore et al., Patent Pools as a Solution to Efficient Licensing of
Complementary Patents? Some Experimental Evidence, 53 J.L. & ECON. 167, 167–69 (2010),
available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/600078?origin=JSTOR-pdf.
148. Id. at 168–69; see also George S. Cary et al., The Case for Antitrust Law to Police the
Patent Holdup Problem in Standard Setting, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 913, 917–18 (2011).
149. See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 6, at 1993, 1995.
150. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006) (holding that a
plaintiff must meet a four-factor test for the court to award injunctive relief); see also Lemley &
Melamed, supra note 30, at 2141 (“The eBay decision raised the bar for the issuance of
injunctions in infringement suits brought by both trolls and practicing entities . . . .”).

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol67/iss2/15

22

Devlin: Antitrust Limits on Targeted Patent Aggregation

2015]

ANTITRUST LIMITS ON TARGETED PATENT AGGREGATION

797

commanded ex ante—before the firm implementing the technology
began investing in its chosen product design.151 This suggests that, to
the extent that patent enforcement promotes social welfare, aggregators
of patents in these fields could enhance efficiency by internalizing
positive externalities that would otherwise bias pricing decisions
upward and by reducing transaction costs.152
Three critical assumptions underlie that possibility. The first is that
the price of the patented technology reflects both the licensee’s designaround options and the claimed invention’s incremental benefit
compared to the next-best alternative. The royalty commanded must not
be based on lock-in and hold-up. The second is that efficiency requires
that every patent be asserted. The third is that such enforcement
achieves royalties that flow to upstream patentees in a way that
magnifies incentives to invent and commercialize new technologies.
These assumptions are unlikely satisfied in many of today’s patentheavy industries outside of biopharmaceuticals and chemicals.
Collectively, the preceding account of today’s patent regime sets the
scene for this Article’s analysis of patent aggregation. To emphasize,
nothing in this Article means to convey skepticism as to the virtue of
IPRs. Patents are often socially justified, and are important instigators
of innovation, especially in the biopharmaceutical setting where the
economic, public-goods justification for IPRs is compelling.153
Similarly, it does not follow that increasing the scale or efficacy of
patent enforcement will reduce welfare. To the contrary, building and
licensing patent portfolios could advance social welfare in the right
circumstances. This Article endeavors to show, however, that a
particular brand of patent accumulation harms static and dynamic
efficiency and that competition laws may serve a prophylactic role in
constraining such aggregation. Accordingly, antitrust has long ensured
that patentees do not usurp their time-limited exclusive rights to acquire
market power beyond the grant of the original patent.
The critical insight is that the timing of patent licensing informs its
desirability. Ex ante technology transfer—taking place prior to an
implementer’s design and introduction of an accused device—is
presumptively efficient because it diffuses novel engineering insights in
151. Lemley & Melamed, supra note 30, at 2178.
152. See id. at 2157. This Article disagrees with Lemley and Melamed’s conclusion that
large-scale PAEs like Intellectual Ventures may be alleviating hold-up problems.
153. See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 14 (2003); see also Michael A. Carrier, Unraveling
the Patent-Antitrust Paradox, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 761, 764 (2002); Gregory N. Mandel, Proxy
Signals: Capturing Private Information for Public Benefit, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 23 (2012);
Rajnish Kumar Rai & Srinath Jagannathan, Do Business Method Patents Encourage
Innovation?, 2012 B.C. INTELL. PROP. & TECH. F. 1, 10.
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a manner that innovators can profitably use to build new products.154
Most importantly, ex ante licensing ensures that market prices are
competitive in that they reflect the technical virtues of the sold
technology.155 Ex post licensing, however, can be problematic156
because of lock-in.157
Once a firm has implemented and sunk capital into a new product
design, a patentee can demand a royalty tied to the threat of shutting
down the firm’s operations rather than to the incremental value of the
licensed patent.158 The severity of this ex post threat depends on the
injury that the patentee can inflict through the patent system. An
injunction, for instance, can permit hold-up of this nature. eBay has
made such relief an improbable remedy for PAEs, which is why the
International Trade Commission has become a forum of choice for
PAEs in light of its granting of exclusion orders comparable to
injunctions.159 As discussed below, PAEs may have means beyond
seeking injunctive relief to impose outsize threats on their targets ex
post.
Nevertheless, the desirability of patent licensing is not as simple as
“ex ante is good; ex post is bad,” nor are ex post royalties exceeding the
ex ante price invariably inefficient. There are important subtleties to the
appropriate economic analysis of such licensing. In particular, a
patentee’s ability to impose a hefty wallop on licensees in the ex post
world does not in itself mean that monopolistic price extractions are
inefficient. The law-and-economics literature addressing the effects of
property, liability, and nonalienability rules shows that the law’s chosen
means of protecting ownership rights can impact the ex ante behavior of
stakeholders.160 Specifically, an injunction or a damages award
exceeding the parties’ subjective value of the property induces ex ante
bargain rather than ex post damages proceedings.161 All else equal, ex
ante negotiations are superior to those taking place after the fact; thus,

154. See FTC, EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE, supra note 3, at 40.
155. See Scott Morton & Shapiro, supra note 28, at 471.
156. E.g., FTC, EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE, supra note 3, at 50–54; see also Scott Morton
& Shaprio, supra note 28, at 487.
157. See, e.g., Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 310 (3d Cir. 2007).
158. See FTC, EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE, supra note 3, at 8.
159. See Mike Heins, Selling Congress on eBay: Should Congress Force the ITC to Apply
the eBay Standard?, 22 FED. CIR. B.J. 589, 590–91 (2013); Xun (Michael) Liu, Note, Joinder
Under the AIA: Shifting Non-Practicing Entity Patent Assertions Away from Small Businesses,
19 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 489, 507–08 (2013).
160. See generally Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules:
An Economic Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1996) (discussing the different economic effects
of property and liability rules).
161. See id. at 756–57.
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disproportionate ex post damages can be desirable.162 But that is not
true when transaction costs preclude effective bargaining ex ante.163
This is the case for many industries in which the patent system currently
plays a material role.164 Insurmountable bargaining costs result from the
numerosity, ambiguity, and suspect validity of patents in certain
sectors.165
In short, ex post licensing that results in monopoly—greater than ex
ante royalties—is desirable only if it incentivizes parties to bargain ex
ante. The problem, however, is that such ex ante technology transfer is
not feasible in certain industries.166 PAEs have zeroed in on this
infeasibility to achieve a lucrative business model founded on hold-up.
The nature of an industry and the relationship between ex ante and ex
post licensing in that setting help in understanding the economics of
PAE aggregation.
This discussion sets the backdrop for understanding the economic
ramifications of mass-scale accumulation and assertion of IPRs. As
indicated above, if NPEs bought and licensed promising patented
technologies that did not exist in commercialized products, they would
almost certainly promote social welfare. PAE conduct, however, is the
antithesis of such efficient aggregation and licensing. This Part
concludes by extrapolating some key insights that inform the discussion
that follows. Then, to illustrate the economic effect of PAE activities,
the next Part explores the consequences of patent accumulation in
distinct hypothetical universes.
C. The Competitive Ex Ante Pricing of Proprietary Technology and Ex
Post Hold-Up
To explore the relative efficiency of concentrated and atomized
patent ownership, one must first identify a competitive baseline for
measuring the efficiency of outcomes. As applied to the licensing of
IPRs, this identification is challenging. Typically, economists equate
competitive outcomes with price equaling the marginal cost of a firm’s
production.167 Applied to the licensing of technology, marginal cost
may be modest once one identifies the relevant parties. When one
introduces IPRs granting an exclusive right to practice a claimed
162. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, A Clear View of The Cathedral: The Dominance of
Property Rules, 106 YALE L.J. 2091, 2096 (1997).
163. See, e.g., Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules,
and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1106–09 (1972).
164. See Ewing & Feldman, supra note 88, at 20.
165. See id. at 24.
166. See FTC, EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE, supra note 3, at 54–56.
167. E.g., Daniel A. Crane, The Paradox of Predatory Pricing, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 33
(2005).
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invention, however, the marginal-cost baseline is no longer apt. In
some—though by no means all—circumstances, that exclusive right
grants the patentee the sustained ability to restrict output or to raise
price in a relevant market.168 In those settings, the “competitive”
reference point is one in which the patentee exercises significant market
power.169 This quality complicates the comparison of pre- and postpatent aggregation.
The antitrust issue is whether the patentee can achieve a positive
change in market power beyond the level that he enjoyed prior to the
scrutinized restraint. The critical time period is prior to
commercialization of the technology claimed in the relevant patent
because of the absence of capital investment and hence lock-in by
potential licensees. In implementing a chosen product design, a firm
suffers nonredeemable costs that prevent it from substituting for an
alternative design at the same cost that was available prior to
investment. That lock-in enables the holder of an IPR to extract greater
value than it could have before the potential licensee invested in
building its chosen technology.
To explain why lock-in enhances the holder of a potentially
infringed patent’s market power, this Article explores what limits exist
before third parties implement their claimed technologies. Specifically,
what constraints limiting patentees’ power over price ex ante cease to
exist, or exist only in diluted form, ex post?
Several qualities limit patentee power ex ante. Envision a
downstream innovator (the firm or potential licensee) that has not yet
chosen and sunk capital into its next-generation product line. The price
that each owner of a relevant patent can demand turns on the value of
her claimed technology vis-à-vis the next best technological substitute.
If a nonproprietary process is available to the firm’s engineers, then the
owner of a patent claiming a different technology that performs the
same function will have no market power and could not command a
price greater than zero. However, even without a substitute for a
proprietary technology, three factors limit the price that the patentee can
demand.
First, the company may be able to design its planned good so that it
does not implicate a particular technology.170 The ease of its ability to
“invent around” the patent limits the other’s value. If an alternative
design would be equally appealing to customers and simple to achieve,
the patentee could charge no more than a vanishingly small amount.
168. See Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 44–45 (2006); Chin, supra
note 115, at 866.
169. See Ill. Tool Works, 547 U.S. at 44–45.
170. See, e.g., State Indus., Inc. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 751 F.2d 1226, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 1985);
cf. Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 313–14 (3d Cir. 2007).
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Second, if an alternate design is either technically infeasible or not
appealing to consumers, the patentee may have monopoly power.171 The
amount of power depends on the anticipated market value of the new
product line. The company would never pay more for a technology than
the expected value of the product that features it.172 Third, the patentee’s
cost of enforcing its right to exclude limits market power. The average
patent case now costs millions of dollars to litigate to judgment.173
Where a reasonable royalty for a particular invention would be modest,
litigation costs limit enforcement and constrain market power.
This is the ex ante world where patent licensing is efficient.
Innovative companies building new goods can use state-of-the-art
technologies, consumers benefit from superior products, and patentees
derive pecuniary returns tailored to the incremental value of their
claimed know-how over those of the next-best-available technology.
Still, this state of affairs is imperfect. The expense of realizing one’s
patent rights deprives some deserving inventors of a monetary reward.
No less seriously, the patent system’s many imperfections stymie
downstream innovators’ ability to identify and obtain technical
solutions to problems. Many patents claim more than what their
inventors actually discovered—especially for means-plus-function
claims174—and the pace of innovation quickly renders many claimed
technologies defunct. Nevertheless, holders of outdated patents can, and
regularly do, claim infringement. Furthermore, the number of IPRs
makes identifying and negotiating with each owner of a patent that
reads on a planned good infeasible. In an optimal system, manufacturers
of technological products could quickly and affordably identify all
patentees who claim technologies reading on their considered product
designs, determine whether those patents are valid and would read on
those designs, and bargain with each owner for a competitively
determined royalty. That aspiration is a world apart from the reality of
today’s system. Nevertheless, even with today’s flawed patent regime,
some ex ante licensing takes place, and when it does, it is presumptively
efficient.
II. PATENT AGGREGATION UNDER VARIOUS CONDITIONS OF
OPTIMALITY: AN EXPLANATORY MODEL
This Part explores the economic consequences of patent
accumulation. Using a hypothetical example subject to changing
171. See Broadcom, 501 F.3d at 314.
172. See Thomas F. Cotter, Four Principles for Calculating Reasonable Royalties in Patent
Infringement Litigation, 27 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 725, 744 n.85 (2011).
173. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
174. See Lemley, supra note 17, at 905, 907–08.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2016

27

Florida Law Review, Vol. 67, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 15

802

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67

assumptions, it illustrates how the welfare effects of patent aggregation
are circumstance-dependent.
Consider a downstream innovator, Alpha, which wishes to develop a
new-generation product comprising 4000 discrete technical functions.175
Alpha must combine all 4000 to create its desired good. The great
majority—3900—of the requisite technologies are either known in the
art or susceptible to independent invention by Alpha’s engineers.176 One
hundred of these functions, however, are cutting-edge and not easily
solved in-house. Nevertheless, they are subject to patented solutions,
“Tier A” patents, upon which Alpha could draw. If Alpha availed itself
of those 100 technologies without securing licenses, it would infringe
all of them. That conclusion holds true regardless of whether Alpha
copied or successfully solved those technical challenges independently
because there is no clean-room defense in patent law.177 Alpha cannot
alter its product design to avoid Tier A patents.
Each of the 3900 remaining technical functions is subject to a
potential infringement claim, which may or may not be well-founded.
Each of 2000 of those functions potentially implicates a “Tier C” patent,
which is of suspect validity. Any Tier C patent has a mere 1% chance
that it is valid and that it reads on Alpha’s planned design. Another
1000 of the 3900 functions may infringe “Tier B” patents, which
arguably read on more novel aspects of the planned product line’s
architecture. Each one has a 30% chance of validly reading on the
chosen design.
Each of the 900 residual functions is subject to two competing
patented solutions that, though technically distinct, perform perfectly
interchangeable functions. No alternative technical solutions are
available for those 900 operations. These patents are definitely valid, so
in manufacturing its desired next-generation good, Alpha would
necessarily infringe 900 patents if it did not obtain licenses.
Alpha could alter its product design to avoid the Tier B and C
patents. In other words, it would be possible at modest cost for Alpha to
“design around” any of those patents if asserted during the engineering

175. Many technological products combine thousands of discrete technologies, so this is a
reasonable assumption. See, e.g., Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 6, at 1992.
176. Again, this is a realistic assumption. Independent invention is the norm in most
industries in which the patent system plays a material role. Research published in 2012 by the
U.S. National Science Foundation shows that only a minority of innovators in all surveyed
industries consider patents to be “very important” to their R&D efforts. JOHN E. JANKOWSKI,
BUSINESS USE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION DOCUMENTED IN NSF SURVEY 1–2 tbl.1
(2012), available at http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/infbrief/nsf12307/nsf12307.pdf.
177. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2012) (providing no defense for independent invention or
unintentional infringement). See generally Vermont, supra note 30 (discussing whether this
aspect of the patent regime makes economic sense).
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phase. Alpha could not, however, avoid Tier A or competing patents.
They are indispensable to realizing the product that Alpha envisions.
In short, Alpha’s proposed future product implicates the following
patented technologies:
Alpha’s Product Design
Total number of discrete technologies needed:
Tier A Patents (100% valid) implicated:
Tier B Patents (30% valid) implicated:
Tier C Patents (1% valid) implicated:
Functions subject to two competing patents (100%
valid):

4000
100
1000
2000
900

The starting point for analyzing this hypothetical is a world of
perfect patent disaggregation where a different patentee has licensing
authority to each of the 4900 proprietary technologies. The expected
value to Alpha of implementing its next-generation good, free of
royalties or damages, is V. The efficient-baseline price for the relevant
patents is PA1E . . . PA100E; PB1E . . . PB1000E; PC1E . . . PC2000E;
PCOMP1E . . . PCOMP1800E. That sum reflects the price upon which Alpha
and each patentee would agree ex ante, which accounts for factors such
as the likelihood of invalidity and noninfringement, the expected value
of the potentially infringing product, alternative technologies, and
design-around feasibility. The royalty that Alpha actually pays each
patentee is R1 . . . R4000, where 0 ≤ R1 . . . R4000 ≤ V.178
A. Perfect Aggregation and Zero Enforcement Costs: The RoyaltyStacking Problem
The first step in this analysis is to chart the relative effects of
aggregation and disaggregation under idealized circumstances and
compare the outcome to the social-welfare optimum. As noted above,
begin by assuming complete atomization. Courts unfailingly award
damages equal to what the parties would have agreed upon ex ante.179
Suppose that enforcement (i.e., litigation) costs are zero and that
granting the owner of a valid, infringed patent a sum equal to the ex
ante market price for that claimed technology enhances welfare.180 Also
178. Alpha would never rationally pay more in royalties than what it expects to gain by
manufacturing and selling the product for which it licensed technology.
179. See Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1324–25 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
180. In other words, assume away imperfections in the patent system that allow inventors
to obtain twenty-year exclusive rights over inevitable inventions that were on the cusp of being
realized anyway and that competition and other inducements drive independent of IPRs. This
assumption also excludes the possibility that patents detract from dynamic efficiency by
allowing inventors of quickly outdated technologies to lay claim to future technologies in
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assume that Alpha can freely determine which patents are invalid and
which, if valid, would read on its future array of goods.
In this zero-transaction-cost environment, Alpha can identify and
negotiate with each of P1 . . . P4900 (i.e., all owners of all relevant
patents) at no cost. Parties bargain in the shadow of law such that their
expectation in eschewing negotiations in favor of litigation sets the
range of terms upon which they will rationally agree.181 The only other
factors establishing the parties’ bargaining range are the parties’
walkway prices. For Alpha, that price is V—ε—[R1 + R2 + . . . +
R4000]—i.e., the expected value of commercializing its desired product
minus the royalties paid to other licensors minus epsilon (a vanishingly
small amount representing the requisite de minimis profit). For each
patentee whose opportunity cost in licensing is zero, the minimum price
at which the patentee will license is ε. Assuming no judicial error, the
court would award damages equal to what the parties would have
agreed upon without litigation, thus making that “competitive” price the
ceiling and floor for the parties bargaining before the fact.
That means that Alpha will acquire licenses to Tier C and B patents
at a price less than or equal to its design-around costs, discounted by the
probability of invalidity and noninfringement. Thus, the Tier B royalty
rate will be thirty times larger than that for Tier C patents. Royalties for
those IPRs will therefore be modest.
What of the 1800 “competitive” patents? As each pair of separatelyowned competitive patents discloses equally effective solutions to the
900 differing functions, the model of Bertrand competition seems
applicable.182 Price competition between each pair of fungible
proprietary technologies will thus produce an equilibrium price equal to
marginal cost.183 Here, the cost of licensing is zero by assumption, so
under disaggregation, Alpha will take its pick of competitive patents for
free.
Prices for competitive and Tier A patents, however, will be
significantly positive. Each such patent is indispensable. Alpha and each
such patentee will negotiate a royalty reflecting V, the expected market
value of the design product, and (to a degree) the number of other
patents that Alpha must combine to obtain a clearing position for the
future product. Because courts would award this amount ex post, the
parties will be indifferent between contracting ex ante and letting the

environments of rapid cumulative innovation. See supra Section I.C. for a discussion of what
the ideal or “competitive” price means in a market for the licensing of proprietary technology.
181. See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 6, at 2021–22.
182. For a discussion of the Bertrand competition model, see MANFRED NEUMANN,
COMPETITION POLICY: HISTORY, THEORY AND PRACTICE 59–61 (2001).
183. See id.
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courts establish that price ex post. By assumption, both avenues are
costless and produce the same royalty.
Yet, as explored in the prior Part, the “competitive” price in this
environment is a range, rather than a point, due to the market power
inherent in a valid patent that covers a valuable product or process.
Even making the outlandish assumptions applied here—zero bargaining
costs, zero litigation costs, and no judicial error—the ideal outcome will
not ensue under disaggregation.
The economic relationship between the 4000 discrete technologies
needed to make Alpha’s envisioned product is one of complementarity.
That means that decreasing the price of any one technology increases
the demand for all of the others, and vice versa—the reason being that,
in the presence of a property rule or suitably draconian liability rule,
Alpha needs licenses to all valid and infringed patents.184
Economists have long recognized the monopoly problem that
emerges when economic complements are subject to diffuse
ownership.185 Because each holder of a patent reading on Alpha’s
design can veto the product’s introduction if a property or severe
liability rule applies, each one has a monopoly.186 In exercising that
power, however, self-interested patentees will ignore the fact that they
are charging higher than a competitive price, which harms all other
holders of relevant patents.187 Economists refer to this phenomenon as
royalty stacking or the Cournot-complements problem.188 Its presence is
undesirable because it results in relatively low output and high prices.189
Even in the absence of transaction costs, litigation costs, and judicial
error, the result of diffuse patent ownership in this example is that the
price of each of the 100 Tier A patents will exceed what it should be.
The surcharge will have one of two negative effects. First, it may
bestow a windfall on some or all patentees and cause allocativeefficiency losses in the downstream product market. Second, it may
cause the collective price of Tier A patents to exceed the expected value
of Alpha’s new product, resulting in a complete loss of value for all
stakeholders.
The essential insight here is that there is a loss in net value under
disaggregation, meaning that a Pareto improvement through free
contract is possible. Specifically, complete vertical integration among
184. When the law protects ownership interests with a property rule, it awards injunctions
in the event of an unauthorized incursion. In contrast, under a liability rule, courts will award
monetary damages only. See Mulligan & Lee, supra note 77, at 315.
185. Supra note 148 and accompanying text.
186. See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 6, at 2009.
187. See id. at 2010.
188. Id. at 2013.
189. See id.
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the owners of Tier A patents would eliminate the royalty-stacking
problem. Assuming the absence of transaction costs, the parties will
avail themselves of the opportunity for mutually beneficial exchange.
Thus, with free bargaining, it follows that each complementary Tier A
patent, PA1 . . . PA100, will reside under the ownership of a single
patentee.
In this model, aggregation of Tier A patents is efficient because it
lowers net price and increases output. Crucially, there is no possibility
of ex post hold-up because of the assumed absence of judicial error and
litigation costs. In other words, no patent aggregator could use the
litigation process to impose asymmetric costs on recalcitrant users of
technology, inducing them to pay more than the competitive price. Note
that aggregating Tier B and C patents would have no effect here
because no royalty-stacking problem arises from disaggregation of these
patents. For the Cournot-complements problem to emerge, owners of
the relevant property rights must have market power. For reasons
discussed above, Tier B and C patentees have none under the
assumptions of this ideal scenario.
Similarly, separate ownership of the 1800 competitive patents will
not create royalty-stacking problems even though any pair of
competitive patents may complement another pair of competitive
patents reading on a different function because each holder of a
competitive patent lacks market power.190 Aggregating these substitute
patents, however, would be anticompetitive. If one entity acquired those
1800 patents—or even just a single pair reading on one function—the
price constraint posed by competition would evaporate. Prices would
rise to the same level as those of Tier A patents, a price level
appropriate only for proprietary technologies for which no substitutes
exist. Between one entity holding all 1800 competitive patents and 900
entities each holding a pair of patents reading on one function, the
former is preferable because the Cournot-complements problem is
present in the latter setting.
In this example, the effects of patent aggregation depend on the
economic relationship between the patents acquired. In the presence of
patentee market power, aggregating complementary inputs needed to
manufacture a downstream product enhances welfare, but combining
substitute patents detracts from it. These basic principles explain why
horizontal acquisitions generally attract antitrust scrutiny and vertical
ones typically do not.

190. See IP LICENSING GUIDELINES, supra note 116, at 4.
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B. Introducing Modest Transaction and Litigation Costs
In practice, one cannot expect costless bargaining, free litigation, and
no judicial error. Moving away from the ideal case toward more
realistic assumptions, this Article will introduce positive transaction and
litigation costs but continue to suppose that courts can unfailingly
determine the “competitive price.” Although the judiciary endeavors to
calculate patent damages in a manner reflecting the ex ante technical
contribution of the infringed patent,191 imputing perfection to that
process goes too far. Nevertheless, adhering to that assumption isolates
the role of transaction and litigation costs on the economics of patent
aggregation.
Relaxing the assumptions of costless bargaining and free litigation
profoundly affects the analysis. One effect is patentee
undercompensation because the private cost of enforcement may exceed
the expected value of filing suit.192 Patent accumulation may in theory
ameliorate this shortcoming by achieving scale economies in litigation,
thus reducing the average cost of patent enforcement. Aggregation, as
before, could potentially reduce the royalty-stacking problem and
diminish transaction costs required for the downstream firm to secure a
clearing position. At the same time, the countervailing problem of
patentee overcompensation and downstream hold-up is avoided by
virtue of the assumed absence of judicial error and because litigation
costs are symmetric. This Article will now explore the bases for these
conclusions.193
1. Patent Atomization and the Undercompensation Problem
Once more, the initial state of affairs is one of perfect
disaggregation. Relax the assumption of zero transaction costs to the
point that the cost of Alpha’s bargaining with any one patentee is
modest—positive, but easily surmountable. Thus, Alpha can readily,
191. E.g., Ga.-Pac. Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970)
(calculating damages by reference to “[t]he amount that a licensor (such as the patentee) and a
licensee (such as the infringer) would have agreed upon (at the time the infringement began) if
both had been reasonably and voluntarily trying to reach an agreement”), modified, 466 F.2d
295 (2d Cir. 1971).
192. The conclusion that a patentee will file suit when the expected value of doing so is
positive depends on the assumption that the patentee is risk neutral. If the patentee is risk averse,
the undercompensation problem will worsen.
193. Two related matters are worthy of note. First, in a world with positive transaction
costs but without litigation costs and judicial error, no private licensing contracts would take
place. Downstream innovators would copy or independently invent, and the courts would
efficiently set the price of use. Second, if litigation costs were positive (and symmetric) but
transaction costs and judicial error were again absent, no litigation would take place, and the
parties would efficiently reach terms. Neither of these situations exists outside of academic
models.
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albeit at positive expense, identify any relevant patent, its owner, and
the likelihood of validity and infringement. The absence of judicial error
remains, but litigation costs are now positive. Assume that the cost to a
patentee of enforcing its IPR and the cost of defending such a lawsuit,
“C,” is constant across the universe of patents. Litigation costs are
therefore symmetric.
The expected damages in bringing suit are DA, DB, and DC for Tier
A, B, and C patents respectively. The expected damages in suing on any
of the 900 competing patents are zero. DB = 30DC. The relationship
between the return and private costs of suing is DA > DB > C > DC.
Thus, in the event that Alpha infringes these patents, only the owners of
Tier A and B patents would sue. As the cost of enforcing their rights
exceeds the expected damages, owners of Tier C patents will not sue.
That fact makes the price of a license for Alpha to Tier C patents zero
under disaggregation.
Under atomization, the first shortcoming is patentee
undercompensation. In the hypothetical, Tier C patent owners as a
group receive suboptimal rewards. At the individual level, twenty
holders of valid and infringed Tier C patents are deprived of their due
return, though the remaining Tier C patentees rightly get nothing. If
patentees are risk neutral, it is irrelevant to social welfare whether (a)
each Tier C patentee gets a sum equal to 1% of the inventive
contribution or (b) the twenty holders of valid and infringed Tier C
patents get 100% of the incremental technical benefit back, and the
remaining 1980 receive nothing.
So, there is an under-reward problem. Litigation costs are to blame
for this, not concentration of patent ownership. All manner of legal
rights are underenforced due to real-world enforcement costs. Lower
assertion of legal rights is generally desirable compared to what the
proper rate of enforcement would be in an ideal universe of zero
transaction costs because filing a lawsuit implicates all manners of
social and private costs. This may render lesser enforcement and
undercompensation more desirable than the first-best paradigm.
Yet, the cost of enforcement—C, in this hypothetical—is the average
cost of asserting a patent only if litigants enforce one at a time. A patent
aggregator may be able to achieve scale economies in assertion. Many
of the activities involved in litigating a case on one patent can overlap
with other patents, so pooling several patents into one case may
eliminate duplicative expense. Suppose that adding more patents to a
case does not add any costs beyond those involved in litigating the first
patent. In other words, suppose that there are perfect scale economies in
patent enforcement. The average cost of patent assertion in a case is
then C/n, where n is the number of patents asserted in the case.

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol67/iss2/15

34

Devlin: Antitrust Limits on Targeted Patent Aggregation

2015]

ANTITRUST LIMITS ON TARGETED PATENT AGGREGATION

809

Although C > DC, it does not follow that C/n > DC when n > 1. In
this hypothetical, if a patent accumulator purchases ten Tier C patents,
the average cost of enforcement may be less than the expected damages.
It follows that aggregation in this situation may remedy
undercompensation by holders of patents that were unprofitable to
assert individually in light of the litigation costs implicated in doing so.
Note, however, that the problem of patent underenforcement in this
hypothetical is modest—limited to patents of dubious validity and
infringement. In this example, as in the real world, one is likely to assert
strong IPRs when they read on valuable products, making the danger of
inadequate inventor compensation modest.
2. Positive Litigation Costs and the Question of Patentee
Overcompensation
In the simple case of no litigation costs and no judicial error,
patentees could not extract more than the marginal technical
contribution of their proprietary method or product over the next best
alternative. Courts would not award them a larger amount of money in
damages, and they could not inflict harm on a patentee separate from or
beyond that damages amount. By assumption, the cost of defending a
lawsuit was zero.
Assuming no judicial error, does the calculus change when one
introduces positive litigation costs? The answer is no, due to the
supposition that litigation costs are symmetric. The cost to Alpha of
defending, and to a patentee of bringing, a lawsuit is C. However, if a
patent aggregator’ litigation costs were lower than Alpha’s, Alpha
would rationally settle for more than the ex ante competitive value of
the patent. This is the first insight into the possibility of hold-up and
patentee overcompensation.
3. Disaggregation and Wasteful Bargaining Costs
Now consider the transaction-cost question. Here, the shortcoming
associated with dispersion of the relevant patents is plain. To secure
licensing permission, Alpha must identify and bargain with each of
3100 patentees (Alpha needs to solve 900 technical functions as to each
of which there are two competing patentees, but because courts would
award reasonable royalties of zero for them, the patentees will not assert
them). At that scale, even bargaining costs that are vanishingly small at
the individual level quickly become preclusive. If “TCm” represents the
transaction costs of bargaining with a single patentee, m, it is a
reasonable assumption that TC1 + TC2 + . . . + TC3100 > V. In other
words, the transaction costs involved in securing licensing permission
over the full universe of relevant patents exceed the expected value of
marketing the next-generation product. If the relevant IPRs remain
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subject to diffuse ownership, Alpha’s choice is either to abandon the
project or to infringe and deal with any lawsuits after the fact.
Here, the benefits of patent aggregation on reducing transaction costs
are clear. By amassing complementary patents, a patent accumulator
would reduce transaction costs by creating a one-stop shop for
licensing. As in the simple hypothetical above, the aggregator would
also eliminate the royalty-stacking problem.
Again, aggregating the competing patents would eliminate
competition, creating market power where there was none. What if a
single aggregator were to combine all of the 3100 complementary
patents and only one patent covering each of the 900 functions subject
to competing patents? Might there still be harm to competition? In
offering a blanket license to its 4000-patent portfolio (i.e., by bundling),
the aggregator might seem to eliminate the competitive constraint that
the 900 patents it does not hold imposed on the pricing for the 900
interchangeable patents in its portfolio. Price theory suggests that such
monopoly leveraging is impossible in fixed-proportions tying of this
kind.194 If anticompetitive effects nevertheless arose, a solution would
be to impose a duty under the antitrust laws to preserve independent
licensing. Such a solution might be to award discounts to the blanket
license. This would preserve competition while facilitating the
transaction-cost benefits of combining complements.
C. Real-Life Complications: Judicial Propensity to Err and High
Litigation Costs
In the real-world case, patent aggregation is most complex and
potentially problematic. The negative consequences associated with
certain forms of IPR aggregation here flow from its interaction with
three features that define the innovation process and technologylicensing markets: litigation costs in the millions of dollars; judicial
error, specifically, unpredictable patent-infringement damages awards
that exceed competitive, ex ante benchmark royalties;195 and high
bargaining costs.

194. See Daniel A. Crane & Joshua D. Wright, Can Bundled Discounting Increase
Consumer Prices Without Excluding Rivals?, 5 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 209 (2009), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=1632968 (arguing that monopolists cannot charge a higher price
for a bundle simply because it contains a monopoly item, as a rational monopolist will already
have charged the profit-maximizing price for the item). But see Einer Elhauge, Tying, Bundled
Discounts, and the Death of the Single Monopoly Profit Theory, 123 HARV. L. REV. 397, 400–01
(2009) (arguing that fixed-proportions tying must combine with a strong positive demand
correlation and a lack of substantial tied foreclosure in order for monopolists to lack leverage).
195. See Lemley & Melamed, supra note 30, at 2143–44.
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1. Background Conditions Necessary to Understand the Effects
of Aggregation
First, the private cost to a party of litigating patent claims to
judgment is typically in the realm of $5 million.196 Enforcement costs of
that magnitude create a de facto fair-use aspect to the modern patent
system because it rarely pays for holders of weak (likely invalid)
patents, which arguably read on peripheral aspects of an accused device,
to file suit. The expected value of doing so is likely negative, except for
strong patents that lay colorable claim to a lucrative product. This
dynamic undercompensates some upstream patentees and permits a
certain degree of free-riding downstream by those commercializing
technology.197
The extent to which this is problematic depends on the probable
validity of the unenforced patents and the prevalence of independent
downstream invention. Likely, a certain degree of underenforcement is
socially desirable given many patents’ chronic invalidity and that the
lion’s share of innovation that gives rise to marketed technology is not
copied but independently realized. Today, there appears to be a publicgoods benefit to incomplete enforcement of weak patents.
Second, damages awards for infringement fluctuate wildly,
especially in front of juries.198 Since eBay, courts award injunctions less
often, and they are especially reluctant to grant such relief to NPEs.199
Nevertheless, the probability that a court will enjoin a firm that an NPE
sued for infringement is greater than zero.200 But a remedy need not be
equitable to devastate a defendant’s bottom line. The median damages
196. See AUVIL & DIVINE, supra note 119, at 35.
197. Cf. Peter Lee, The Accession Insight and Patent Infringement Remedies, 110 MICH. L.
REV. 175, 208 (2011).
198. See, e.g., Christopher B. Seaman, Reconsidering the Georgia-Pacific Standard for
Reasonable Royalty Patent Damages, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1661, 1665–66.
199. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391, 394 (2006) (holding that
injunctive relief is not automatic in the event of patent infringement, but it depends on the
traditional four-factor test in equity). Lower courts quickly got the message. See also, e.g.,
Amado v. Microsoft Corp., No. SA CV 03-242 DOC, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96487, at *31
(C.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2007), aff’d in part and vacated in part, 517 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2008);
Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., No. 2:04-CV-211-DF, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61600, at *17
(E.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2006), aff’d in part and vacated in part, 504 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2007); z4
Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 437, 439 (E.D. Tex. 2006).
200. Post-eBay, courts have sometimes awarded NPEs permanent injunctions. See, e.g.,
Joyal Prods. v. Johnson Elec. N. Am., Inc., No. 04-5172, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15531, at *43
(D.N.J. Feb. 27, 2009), aff’d, 335 Fed. App’x 48 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Commonwealth Scientific &
Indus. Research Org. v. Buffalo Tech. Inc., 492 F. Supp. 2d 600, 607–08 (E.D. Tex. 2007); see
also Callaway Golf Co. v. Acushnet Co., 585 F. Supp. 2d 600, 621 n.28, 622 (D. Del. 2008)
(granting a permanent injunction even though the patentee was no longer making products
incorporating the infringed technology), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, and vacated in part, 576
F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
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award from 2007 to 2012 was $4.9 million, but there were three awards
greater than $1 billion in 2012 alone.201 Many outlier judgments have
little apparent relationship to the marginal benefit that the infringed
patent offered over alternative technologies ex ante, but they often seem
to track the infringing device’s market value. Thus, although one of the
Georgia-Pacific factors seems to track the efficient benchmark of ex
ante licensing, awards deviate from that amount in practice. A particular
oddity of the damages-calculation process responsible for this
phenomenon is that, after finding that the patent is valid and infringed,
the factfinder must assume that, in negotiating ex ante, the licensor and
licensee would have presumed that the probability of validity and
infringement was 100%.202 That is an unrealistic account of real-life
negotiations ex ante and an economic mistake.203
It should be no surprise to learn that juries and judges err. As the
awards occupying the upper spectrum of damages represent a material
portion of even successful companies’ profits, the prospect of an
uncertain damages sum is unnerving. It is not rare for leading
innovators to settle pending patent litigation for eight- or even ninefigure amounts.
Third, transaction costs are not merely high but are often fatal to ex
ante licensing.204 Outside of the biopharmaceutical and chemical
industries, technology products typically implicate thousands of discrete
technical functions. Such goods suffer a concomitant vulnerability to an
equal number of separate claims of patent infringement. Illustratively,
RPX Corp., a defensive patent-buying fund, has concluded that more
than 250,000 active patents are relevant to contemporary
smartphones.205
Factors beyond the sheer number of patents drive preclusive
bargaining costs. Vague claims, indeterminate scope, and questionable
validity characterize many patents outside of the life sciences.206 The
sheer number and obscurity of patents in technology industries mean
that innovators today typically ignore patents altogether in designing
201. PWC, 2013 PATENT LITIGATION STUDY: BIG CASES MAKE HEADLINES, WHILE PATENT
CASES PROLIFERATE 3, 5, available at http://www.pwc.com/en_US/us/forensicservices/publications/assets/2013-patent-litigation-study.pdf. With respect to outlier damages on
the high end, the Federal Circuit often reduces them on appeal or the parties settle for
significantly less than the amount awarded. Id. at 3.
202. Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
203. See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 6, at 2019–20. But see Doug Lichtman,
Understanding the RAND Commitment, 47 HOUS. L. REV. 1023, 1040–41 (2010) (arguing that
the assumption of validity and infringement is necessary to compensate the patentee for
incurring the risk of assertion).
204. See Lemley & Melamed, supra note 30, at 2149 n.140.
205. RPX CORP., supra note 13, at 59.
206. Lemley, supra note 17, at 930–31.
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and developing new products.207 The transaction costs needed to secure
freedom of operation ex ante—before firms devote capital to marketing
a chosen product line—are prohibitive. Consequently, innovators today
generally invent independently of IPRs and deal with any infringement
claims after the fact.208 Ex ante patent licensing typically takes place
only when a patent is prominent and indispensable to implementing a
particular good or in the rare case where it offers a solution to an
otherwise intractable problem.
That dynamic is crucial for understanding the effects of patent
aggregation in the real world. Now, return to the hypothetical example
of Alpha, incorporating the preceding three features of the
contemporary patent system. The analysis begins, once more, with
atomization. The welfare effects of patent accumulation in this realistic
scenario depend heavily on the likelihood of patent validity, the
presence of ex ante design alternatives, and the timing of the patent
assertion. Recall that the key performance metric is the “competitive”
deal that parties would strike ex ante in a low-transaction-cost setting,
where the prospect of design-around, the expected value of the proposed
new technology product, the downstream technology firm’s alternative
investment options, competition from substitute patents, and countersuit
risk between operating firms all cabin patentee market power.
2. Efficient Aggregation: Tier A Patents
A situation in which aggregation is not only efficient given realistic
assumptions, but where the fact or threat of ex post hold-up can also
serve a desirable function is illuminative: consider Tier A patents. These
are not only valid; they can solve Alpha’s engineering challenges.
Alpha can either copy their teachings or attempt to solve the problems
that those patents solve independently. Either way, Alpha will infringe,
though in the former case the lack of a license would translate into
treble damages for willful infringement and a possible injunction.209 In
the latter instance, outlier damages and a possible injunction are real
dangers. Alpha thus has a powerful incentive to secure licensing
authority ex ante.
a. The Problematics of Hold-Up and Disaggregation
In the event of infringement, each Tier A patentee could hold up
Alpha. In securing an injunction or credibly threatening to obtain one,
each patentee would lay claim to the value of Alpha’s entire product,
not just the subcomponent on which the asserted patent reads. If the
207. Id. at 934.
208. Id. at 934–35.
209. 35 U.S.C. §§ 283–84 (2012).
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court erroneously awarded excessive damages, the economic effect
would be similar. In either event, the sum that Alpha will rationally pay
no longer reflects the ex ante contribution of the infringed technology;
rather, it reflects the harm that a Tier A patentee can inflict after the
fact. As the latter amount exceeds the former, Tier A patentees can
extract supracompetitive royalties—sums exceeding the efficient ex
ante benchmark.
Note, however, that a single patentee cannot use litigation costs to
inflate further the settlement amount that Alpha would pay ex post. If
the plaintiff and defendant experience identical costs, “C,” then a Tier A
patentee’s threat to impose a cost of C on Alpha carries an equal cost
for the plaintiff, and thus simply expands the parties’ bargaining range.
For instance, if the expected damages from going to trial on a Tier A
patent are $25 million and the costs of litigation are $5 million for both
the plaintiff and the defendant, a bargaining range exists between $20
and $30 million if the parties are risk neutral. The patentee is as likely to
settle for less than the damages amount as Alpha is to settle for more.
Furthermore, because IPR ownership is atomized, the Tier A patentee
cannot threaten to inflict losses via serial assertion to punish Alpha for
recalcitrance.
Nevertheless, the amount that Alpha is likely to pay each Tier A
patentee ex post is greater than the ex ante benchmark amount. Is this
problematic? Generally it would be, but not here. In this situation,
economists typically recommend using a property rule to protect an
entitlement. Tier A patents are definitely valid and infringed, but the
courts have limited ability to calculate accurately the appropriate
measure of damages. The parties have superior information about the
value that they respectively place on the claimed invention and its role
in the new downstream product. The law should therefore induce parties
to bargain before the fact by imposing a disproportionately high penalty
on an entity invading an entitlement without permission. An injunction
or inflated damages award carries the same effect—either remedy
makes it unprofitable for a party to appropriate unilaterally another’s
property right, thus inducing ex ante bargain. Such voluntary contracts
produce superior results.
But this conclusion raises three important issues. First, is ex ante
bargain necessarily better here? The fact that Alpha will rationally seek
permission ex ante does not ensure that the parties will actually agree to
the idealized “efficient” or “competitive” benchmark price. That may
seem counterintuitive since this Article defines that metric by the terms
upon which the parties would have agreed ex ante as opposed to ex
post. The complication lies in the feedback effect from the parties’
expectations in eschewing ex ante negotiations and instead litigating ex
post. As mentioned, people bargain in the shadow of law.
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If the courts will award the owner of each Tier A patent excessive
damages of, say, $100 million after the fact, does that mean that each
such patentee will refuse to license ex ante for less than that amount?
The answer is no because choices still exist ex ante that evaporate ex
post. At the planning stage, Alpha is under no obligation to press ahead
in its planned product design. It could invest its capital in an alternative
product not implicating the Tier A patents, thus denying the owners of
those IPRs a licensing opportunity. Alpha and Tier A patentees are both
better off if they negotiate a mutually satisfactory deal. Even here, the
choice constraint limits ex ante royalties.
Second, the conclusion that harsh ex post penalties efficiently induce
ex ante bargaining only holds true if transaction costs are surmountable.
In practice, they may not be, especially when patent ownership is
atomized. If Alpha simply cannot identify and negotiate with the holder
of every Tier A patent, then injunctive relief or damages greater than ex
ante royalties would be inefficient—a form of undesirable hold-up. The
point here is that injunctions and disproportionate damages awards are
punitive—designed to deter wrongful conduct. But in the presence of
high transaction costs, failure to obtain licenses ex ante is not wrongful,
it is inevitable.
Third, the Cournot-complements problem discussed above still
applies in the presence of disaggregation. The ex ante royalty for each
Tier A patent, as agreed upon in a market, will be larger under
atomization than under concentrated ownership. If a different firm owns
every such patent, none of those companies will consider that insisting
on higher royalties may, combined with other high prices charged by
other patentees, scupper the entire project by rendering negative the
expected value of the product design to Alpha.
b. Desirable Aggregation of Valid Patents
Under disaggregation, the transaction costs involved in identifying
and negotiating ex ante with the 100 Tier A patentees may sully the
entire project if Alpha perceives that the damages risk is too severe. The
same may be true if, ignoring the positive externalities attendant upon
its pricing decision, each Tier A patentee charges more than it should.
Then, the total royalties obligation may swamp the benefits to Alpha of
proceeding with its project, thus leaving Alpha and all Tier A patentees
worse off.
Patent accumulation may solve both deficiencies. If an aggregator
acquired all Tier A patents, the result would be reduced transaction
costs for Alpha and a lower overall price due to the elimination of
Cournot-complements effects. However, that positive conclusion rests
on the critical assumption that Alpha must know or be realistically
capable of learning about the Tier A patents and who owns them. If a
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firm acquires all such patents and actively seeks to license them to
downstream technology firms building next-generation products, an
unambiguous increase in efficiency results. Conversely, if an aggregator
combined patents and affirmatively invested in concealing them, it
would aggravate rather than remedy the royalty-stacking problem and
hold-up threat associated with IPR disaggregation in high-transactioncost environments.
Issues of concealment and strategic hold-up aside, might there be an
antitrust problem associated with the assignment of all Tier A patents to
a single owner? The answer is no. By definition, every such patent is
valid and infringed, and each is necessary to make Alpha’s desired new
product a reality. The Tier A patents are economic complements rather
than substitutes, and by assumption, each would be enforced regardless
of who owns it. Given those assumptions, a fixed amount of monopoly
power flows from the original Tier A patentee to the assignee
aggregator.
Thus, aggregation is generally desirable for complementary patents
that are valid and infringed. Such IPRs are necessary inputs in the
downstream commercialization process, so the public policy question is
how to ensure their licensing at the lowest social cost and at a price
reflecting their ex ante value. Dispersed ownership of such patents
hinders that goal, while aggregation in the hands of a firm focused on
licensing ex ante (albeit under threat of ex post suit) is desirable. This
holds true under real-life assumptions of high transaction costs, judicial
error, and expensive litigation. That conclusion, however, depends on
assertion of the valid, infringed patents and on downstream
implementers of technology identifying those patents in the design
phase ex ante.
3. Problematic Aggregation: Tier B & Tier C Patents
In the real world, IPRs bearing the qualities of Tier A patents are in
the minority. Many patents, and especially those involving business
methods and computer-implemented processes, are of uncertain validity
and scope. In the parlance of the hypothetical exercise of this Part, Tier
B and C patents represent such IPRs. What does the disaggregated
world of Tier B and C patents look like, given realistic assumptions of
high transaction costs, judicial error, and multimillion-dollar litigation
costs?
a. The Social-Welfare Benefits of Limited Weak-Patent
Assertion
The answer is limited enforcement. Tier C patents, in particular, will
sit dusty on shelves because no owner of such a standalone patent
would rationally spend millions of dollars enforcing a dud right. After
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all, each one has a 99% chance that the court will find it invalid or not
infringed. From a public policy perspective, this might be somewhat
problematic; however, when downstream innovators have no need to
rely on such patents’ teachings—when in-house engineers can readily
solve the technical problem that the patent purports to address—the
underenforcement has little to no effect on long-run consumer welfare.
To the extent that certain patents neither result in consumable
technology reaching the market nor inform follow-on innovation, they
make a minimal contribution to society. That conclusion is magnified
when the PTO should not have granted the patent on account of its
obviousness, invalidity, nonutility, or insufficient disclosure.
What of the owners of Tier B patents? If such patentees tried to
assert their rights ex ante, they would enjoy minimal pricing power
because Alpha can, at modest cost, design around any asserted Tier B
patent, thus avoiding any infringement claim. Informing Tier B
patentees of that fact, Alpha will either take a license at a low royalty
that properly reflects the de minimis contribution that the Tier B patents
make vis-à-vis other technological designs or it will eschew a license
and slightly alter its design.
Ex post, however, some Tier B patentees may more effectively assert
their rights. One might question why Alpha would expose itself to this
risk knowing the unpredictability of patent damages and the price of
litigation. The answer lies in the realistic assumption that transaction
costs are preclusive ex ante. It would make no economic sense for
Alpha to identify and negotiate with 1000 Tier B patentees. While those
Tier B patentees who do sue after the fact when Alpha’s product is
successful may be able to extract greater than ex ante royalties, three
factors temper their ability to do so. First, each such patentee must
spend $5 million to assert its right with the knowledge that there is a
70% chance that it will recover nothing. Second, due to disaggregation,
no such patentee can pool the risk of loss among a portfolio of patents
whose risk profiles are not correlated, so they are likely risk averse.
That makes Tier B patentees even less likely to file suit. Third, to the
extent that a Tier B patentee competes in a product market with Alpha,
filing suit would invite a patent-infringement countersuit from Alpha.
The combined effect of these features is to limit enforcement. Some
lawsuits take place, and Tier B patentees as a group are technically
undercompensated. Nevertheless, the absence of copying and failure of
such patentees to license ex ante and thus to commercialize their
patented insights makes this limited enforcement of mild concern at
worst and socially beneficial at best. In short, disaggregation generates a
public-goods benefit, taking the form of weak-patent underenforcement.
This leads to the central concern of this Article: strategic patent
aggregation, followed by ex post assertion, founded on generating
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substantial hold-up power. IPR accumulation can harm social welfare
by allowing an aggregator to command substantially greater royalties
than dispersed owners of the relevant patents could have obtained. As
these patent acquisitions generate otherwise absent market power,
causing prices to exceed the efficient ex ante benchmark, they may
generate antitrust concerns without countervailing justifications. In
certain cases of PAE hold-up, such justifications are likely elusive.
b. Anticompetitive Patent Aggregation of Extremely Weak
Patents
This Subsection begins with the most extreme case: Could a PAE
extract significantly greater than ex ante royalties by amassing IPRs as
weak as the Tier C patents in this Part’s illustrative example? It is
important to begin with this hard question because the efficiency and
antitrust cases against patent accumulation are strongest when an
aggregator can realize monopoly power ex post that did not exist ex
ante. This analysis demonstrates that a patent aggregator may amass
individually worthless patents of dubious quality, yet command
extraordinary sums for a license to its portfolio. How does this strawinto-gold alchemy work?
Envision a firm versed in the idiosyncrasies of today’s patent
system. It understands that ex ante licensing in technology-transfer
markets, though efficient, has limited worth from a patentee’s
perspective because several factors limit an IPR-holder’s power over
price. These include licensee design-around options and investment
alternatives. It knows that, ex post, a prospective licensee has locked
into its new product line and thus abandoned those previously available
choices. It also knows that this sunk investment infuses likely valid and
infringed patents with considerable market power, but that its impact on
individually weak patents is more modest because the cost of assertion
is justifiable over a single IPR only if the odds of recovery are
attractive. The firm appreciates further that the owner of a potentially
infringed patent, be it strong or weak, may not sue if it competes in the
same market as the alleged infringer. Defensive portfolios owned by
operating companies and covering rivals’ products abound in hightechnology markets, so one suit begets another in response.
Out of this milieu, the firm eyes an opportunity. First, it bypasses
any countersuit constraint by adopting a business model that does not
practice any technology. Such companies, known as NPEs, are
invulnerable to patent-infringement countersuit. They are also tailormade for relatively cheap litigation because their exposure to discovery
costs is modest. Second, the firm (now NPE) identifies existing or soonto-be-realized products that are lucrative. These goods become its
targets. Third, the firm amasses many weak patents that have some
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tenuous relationship to those products. Because the ex ante market value
of such IPRs is minimal, the NPE can buy those IPRs at low cost.
Fourth and critically, the firm abstains from approaching prospective
licensees until they are actively marketing the products that the NPE
claims infringe on its patents. This quality transforms the NPE into a
PAE. Indeed, some prominent PAEs invest in concealment.210 Only
then does the PAE threaten its targets with serial litigation and
catastrophic damages unless they pay exorbitant amounts, typically
many multiples of the sums that the PAE spent to acquire the asserted
IPRs.
This account describes the approach that PAEs often take, but it does
not explain how a PAE’s threat is credible. How, precisely, can an
aggregator of weak patents convince an operating company to part with
tens or even hundreds of millions of dollars? The answer lies in
subjecting a prospective licensee to a cost far exceeding the ex ante
competitive baseline royalty. The essential condition for anticompetitive
aggregation of non-substitute patents is the creation of an unavoidable
threat. If PAEs credibly threaten prospective licensees with devastating
costs, regardless of how the targeted firms conduct their business
processes or from whom else they acquire patent licenses, then patent
aggregation can facilitate hold-up, even with patents of nugatory
individual worth.
This point raises a seeming contradiction. A patentee endangers an
accused infringer’s product if its patent is valid, infringed, and reads on
so central a component of the product that the claimed technology is the
basis for consumer demand. In that situation, a serious threat exists to
the potential licensee because the legal process will give the IPR owner
a potentially draconian remedy. Yet if a patent is invalid, pertinent if at
all only to a peripheral aspect of an accused device, and ultimately not
infringed, then the law entitles its holder to nothing. How, then, could a
PAE get something by asserting it? The answer is that its hold-up ability
emanates from judicial error, litigation costs, and above all obscurity. A
PAE can achieve this ability by taking advantage of shortcomings in the
patent system through aggregation, and exacerbating the problem by
concealing the extent of its patent holdings.
The threat that the owner of many weak patents can present to a
potential licensee takes the following forms: (i) an injunction; (ii) a
catastrophic damages verdict; (iii) large litigation costs; and (iv) a
combination of (i)–(iii). To inflict the first two forms of injury, a PAE
must actually win, which is why the owner of a small number of patents
cannot viably threaten a downstream technology company. But if a

210. See infra note 287 and accompanying text.
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company can acquire a practically inexhaustible supply of such IPRs, it
may impose a substantial hold-up threat.
Return to the Alpha hypothetical. A PAE only needs to enjoin the
innovator, Alpha, once for Alpha to lose the entire value of its new
product design. It is no solace that a PAE may lose on forty patent
claims before ultimately prevailing on one. If the injunction’s hold-up
value exceeds the expected litigation costs in securing it, then it will be
rational for a risk-neutral PAE to persevere in pressing losing patent
claims until it finally hits big. Moreover, as PAEs are invariably repeat
players, game theory suggests that it may be rational for them to litigate
aggressively in the hope of eventually securing a goldmine judgment,
even if the expected value of doing so with respect to one prospective
licensee is negative. If that lost income translates into superior hold-up
ability against other targets—if its investment in building an aggressive
reputation is sufficiently valuable—a PAE would be justified in losing
money to make an example of a prominent technology firm that refuses
to play ball.
Suppose, then, that a PAE observes the space within which Alpha
operates and takes note of the latter’s profitability. It sees that Alpha is
developing a promising, next-generation product line. At that stage, the
PAE could acquire licensing authority to patents it considers relevant to
the announced design, approach Alpha to present its proprietary
technology, and negotiate an appropriate license. Instead of doing so, it
waits until Alpha has built and is successfully marketing its new good.
The PAE then springs into action, scouring the marketplace for cheap
patents that arguably read on some element of Alpha’s new product. It
keeps its purchasing campaign secret from Alpha until it has acquired a
critical volume of weak patents. To illustrate, suppose that it amasses
one-quarter of all Tier C patents. Only then, having built a wall of
individually shaky but collectively formidable IPRs around the new
product, does the PAE approach Alpha. Instead of offering a price tied
to the ex ante competitive benchmark—PC1E + . . . + PC500E—it
demands far more: say, half the market value of Alpha’s product, V.
Surveying the quality of the patents that the PAE presents, Alpha
asks why it should pay so much. The PAE threatens that the alternative
is a series of lawsuits until it obtains an injunction, at which point it will
demand V - ε as the price of allowing Alpha to continue marketing its
good. Alpha realizes that, although it would have a 99% chance of
prevailing against a single Tier C patent, its odds become less favorable
as the number of patents-in-suit increases. Against an onslaught of ten
Tier C patents, Alpha would face an almost 10% chance of being
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enjoined.211 The expected cost of defending that first wave alone would
therefore be C + V/10,212 likely vastly larger than the competitive
benchmark royalties for the respective patents in the portfolio.
Crunching the numbers, Alpha realizes that it nearly certainly infringes
at least one valid Tier C patent in the PAE’s portfolio. The targeted
patent aggregation, even of junk patents bearing an independent 1%
chance of being valid and infringed, creates a real hold-up threat as
indicated in the following graph:

The preceding conclusion assumed that a court would definitely
enjoin Alpha if the PAE prevailed on an infringement claim. In the posteBay world, it is difficult for PAEs to obtain injunctions, though it is not
impossible.213 The hold-up threat, however, is not contingent on the
nuclear remedy of an injunction. That is merely the clearest case, and a
sufficiently high damages amount—in this hypothetical, any amount
equal to or exceeding V—carries the same effect.
If injunctive relief is unavailable, the hold-up threat depends on two
contingencies: (i) the PAE must succeed on at least one Tier C patent
claim and (ii) the factfinder must erroneously award damages
significantly greater than the appropriate ex ante benchmark. How
likely is it that the second event will materialize with respect to patents
211. To be precise, there is a 9.56% chance that Alpha will infringe at least one of the ten
patents.
212. C is the cost of defending the lawsuit, which in the real world would be several
million dollars.
213. See supra notes 199–200 and accompanying text.
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as weak as the illustrative Tier C patents here? The answer is very
likely.
Under the rules governing reasonable-royalty determinations,
factfinders must assume that the ex ante probability of validity and
infringement was 100%.214 Applied to this hypothetical, a jury would
have to assume that the Tier C patent was definitely valid and infringed
before the fact, thus overstating the economic value of the IPR onehundred fold. That overvaluation enables it, at a minimum, to stake a
claim to a pecuniary sum from Alpha that exceeds the competitive ex
ante royalty benchmark.
That level of damages inflation flows from a substantive flaw in the
law governing the calculation of reasonable royalties. Juries and judges,
however, are likely to err in identifying and accounting for the
economic phenomena surrounding ex ante negotiation, including
design-around, substitute technologies, the expected market value of the
envisioned product design, and so on. The prospect of error in the
damages calculation is particularly acute in this setting because the
technological complexity of the claimed invention, its role in the
accused device, and the idiosyncrasies and abstract nature of a
hypothetical negotiation between warring parties combine to overwhelm
many judges and juries.215 Not surprisingly, factfinders often exaggerate
the hypothetically-negotiated reasonable royalty. That is especially
likely to occur when the infringed patent claims one of the many
thousands of technologies that an innovator must combine to create a
marketed product.216
Some believe that juries and judges are more likely to overestimate
damages.217 Nevertheless, it is possible that factfinders are as likely to
understate damages as they are to overestimate them, in which case the
expected damages award may be the correct one. If that is the case,
outlier awards will not trouble firms that commercialize technologies
214. See Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
215. See generally Scott Brewer, Scientific Expert Testimony and Intellectual Due Process,
107 YALE L.J. 1535 (1998) (discussing the difficulties juries and judges have with the technical
nature of patent cases and criticizing their unjustified deference to indicia of scientific
expertise).
216. Recently, the Federal Circuit wisely cabined the use of the “entire market value rule,”
allowing a plaintiff to tie its damages claim to the market value of the accused device only when
the patented technology is the basis for consumer demand for that product. Uniloc USA, Inc. v.
Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1318–21 (Fed. Cir. 2011). That court has recognized that
referring juries to the overall worth of the accused device can bias damages upward.
LaserDynamics, Inc. v. Quanta Computer, Inc., 694 F.3d 51, 68 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
217. See Lemley & Melamed, supra note 30, at 2144. But see David W. Opderbeck, Patent
Damages Reform and the Shape of Patent Law, 89 B.U. L. REV. 127, 137 (2009) (finding the
empirical evidence on whether patent awards are systemically excessive to be inconclusive and
observing that outlier high awards “skew[] the data and the public debate”).
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downstream. This only holds true if those firms are risk neutral. Faced
with the prospect of potentially ruinous damages—jury awards on the
high end reach ten figures,218 and the Federal Circuit has upheld many
awards in the nine-figure range219—firms are likely to be highly risk
averse. Conversely, PAEs can diversify risk by litigating several
infringement suits with uncorrelated risk profiles, and they are more
likely to be risk neutral. They may, in fact, be risk preferring in
individual cases, especially high-profile ones, because a large award in
one would facilitate more effective hold-up of other potential infringers.
In short, even if the average damages award that judges and juries grant
over time is “correct,” asymmetric appetite for risk will cause
downstream technology companies to settle for amounts greater than the
ex ante benchmark royalty. Because factfinders must assume that the
likelihood of infringement and validity was 100% ex ante, damages
awards are inherently biased upward vis-à-vis the appropriate economic
yardstick. Some measure of ex post hold-up is always available to
suitably motivated PAEs ex post, even when the constituent patents are
weak.
In sum, a PAE in this hypothetical could hold up Alpha by acquiring
a large number of Tier C patents. Investing in a predatory reputation
with which to threaten other prospective licensees, the PAE credibly
threatens to sue Alpha repeatedly with patents that bear just a 1%
chance of being valid and infringed. No countersuit opportunity exists.
Knowing that defending each lawsuit will cost several million dollars,
that the PAE’s litigation costs are lower than its own, and that recurring
suit carries an initially low but increasingly rising probability of an
infringement finding and excessive damages award, Alpha will
rationally pay a large sum to avoid this hold-up threat.
Ex ante, the Tier C patents would have commanded almost no value
because of Alpha’s design-around options and the near-guaranteed
invalidity or noninfringement of those IPRs. This is why the PAE could
buy them at fire-sale prices. The difference in the PAE’s acquisition
costs and the amount for which Alpha (and other licensees) settle ex
post represents the change in market power realized by the strategic
218. See, e.g., supra note 201 and accompanying text.
219. See, e.g., Versata Software, Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 717 F.3d 1255, 1266–67, 1269
(Fed. Cir. 2013) (affirming a $345 million damages award based on infringement of a software
patent); i4i Ltd. P’ship v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 839 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (affirming a $240
million damages award and injunction), aff’d, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011). In another case, the
Federal Circuit affirmed a $185.6 million jury verdict, doubled to $371.2 million, which
reportedly exceeded the defendant’s 2011 net income. Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L.
Gore & Assocs., Inc., 670 F.3d 1171, 1178, 1193 (Fed. Cir. 2012), aff’d in part and vacated in
part, 682 F.3d 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Jonathan Stempel, Court Upholds $371 Million CR Bard
Patent Award, REUTERS (Feb. 10, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/10/us-crbardgore-ruling-idUSTRE8191BH20120210.
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patent aggregation. Alpha could not have nipped this nascent threat in
the bud by buying licenses ex ante to the 500 patents that the PAE later
asserted ex post. Even if the transaction costs of identifying those IPRs
and negotiating royalties were surmountable, a larger universe of 1500
Tier C patents remained for the PAE to purchase and assert ex post.
Alpha cannot avoid this threat except by abandoning its future product
designs or by acquiring licenses to every conceivable patent in the field
that might ever conceivably be asserted ex post. For the many reasons
discussed above, the latter avenue is wholly unrealistic and simply not
an option.
c. Anticompetitive Patent Aggregation of Moderately Weak
Patents
The preceding account explained that aggregating even the weakest
imaginable patents into a sufficiently large portfolio, coupled with the
credible threat of serial assertion, generates a hold-up threat due to
judicial proclivity for error and high litigation costs. This Part concludes
by briefly addressing an intermediate case. What are the potential
ramifications of collecting IPRs bearing characteristics of Tier B
patents?
The effects are similar to those recounted immediately above, save
that the critical mass of patents needed to mount a viable threat is
smaller. When each patent bears a 30% chance of being valid and
infringed, the odds that a portfolio contains at least one such IPR is as
follows:

The hold-up threat here is pronounced at a modest acquisition scale.
To appreciate the welfare effects of aggregating such patents, focus first
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on the ex ante world in which these IPRs are subject to atomized
ownership. By assumption, Alpha could design around any asserted Tier
B patent ex ante, and no such patent yields Alpha a solution that its
engineers could not readily solve. In that situation, Tier B patents would
command only a modest value at the product-design phase, made more
modest still by the fact that a patentee asserting such a patent would
face a 70% chance of recovering nothing.
Ex post, however, the design constraint limiting a Tier B patent’s
value evaporates. In suing ex post, the owner of a single such patent
should get no more than the modest royalty it could have commanded
before the fact. Judicial error is rife, however, so Alpha faces a risk that
the factfinder will fail to credit the design-around alternatives that strip
Tier B patents of economic value. Alpha also knows that the law
requires that the factfinder must look past the probable invalidity or
noninfringement of each such IPR and inflate the damages measure to a
330% recovery. Furthermore, Alpha knows it will suffer irrecoverable
litigation costs of millions of dollars in defending a suit. It will therefore
pay a much larger amount ex post than it would have paid ex ante. It
cannot avoid such ex post hold-up by acquiring a clearing position ex
ante due to preclusive transaction costs.
This leads to a startling conclusion: absent patent aggregation, the
holder of even one patent bearing a colorable claim of reading on a
lucrative product can engage in strategic hold-up by (i) refusing to
approach a known implementer of technology; (ii) waiting for that firm
to irreversibly invest in a potentially infringing product line; (iii)
approaching that firm when it is actively selling its new product; and
(iv) demanding greater than ex ante royalties based on threat of suit.
Thus, the patentee’s market power naturally evolves by virtue of
changing market conditions and due to the presence of judicial error and
high litigation costs. The patentee can realize gain in pricing power
merely through inaction.220
A PAE, however, can do much more. The single patentee remains
subject to real constraints ex post that a PAE can avoid. Those
limitations on monopoly power include the likelihood of invalidity or
noninfringement, litigation costs that may make suing a negative value
proposition, and, potentially, countersuit and reputational constraints.
Those factors prevent many Tier B-type patentees from suing, which is
a desirable consequence on account of the hold-up possibility and the
prevalence of independent invention. By amassing just thirteen Tier B
patents, however, a PAE can subject Alpha to a greater than 99%
chance of a finding of infringement. This high probability creates a
220. As the next Part explains, such a realization of market power likely falls outside the
zone of antitrust scrutiny. Competition laws rarely impose affirmative duties but more typically
prohibit active conduct that inefficiently produces monopoly power.
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more distinct threat for Alpha than a standalone assertion of one Tier B
patent, which Alpha has a 70% chance of successfully defeating. Such a
PAE bypasses the other ex post constraints that limit individual
assertion for the same reasons discussed above. Therefore, PAEs can
magnify ex post holdup.221
This analysis reveals why the oft-touted PAE argument that its
business model promotes an active patent-licensing market by desirably
rewarding upstream patentees and boosting innovation is wrong. Ex
ante aggregation and licensing would carry those benefits, but ex post
targeted patent accumulation is founded on extracting far greater
amounts than patent holders could have realized during the productdesign phase. Since the PAE itself acts not as a conduit for transferring
wealth from downstream innovators to upstream patentees but as a
bottleneck that captures much of the value for itself, it is unlikely that
any benefit to patenting incentives outweighs the harm to downstream
incentives to commercialize technology.222 As the act of patenting
carries little or no social value absent concomitant marketing or
informing follow-on innovation, PAE wealth extraction through ex post
hold-up almost certainly suppresses dynamic efficiency and harms
consumers.223
The preceding account is just one of many species of patent
aggregation, and it is of a particularly odious kind. The question that
this Article explores, however, is whether there may be an antitrust case
against extreme versions of hold-up founded on patent accumulation.
The next Part explains that such a case indeed exists. Although there are
challenges to establishing a Sherman Act violation based on targeted
acquisitions of complementary IPRs, those difficulties stem from the
novel context in which possible antitrust claims arise. The principles
governing whether a cause of action may exist, however, are quite
traditional.
III. TARGETED PATENT AGGREGATION AS MONOPOLIZATION
This Part explores how PAEs might fit into the antitrust model in a
way that would permit control of their conduct and its costs. It explores
concepts of harm, relevant market, monopoly power and exclusionary
conduct to make the case that such control is appropriate.
221. In the real world, patents vary in quality from definitely valid and infringed to junk,
rather than three distinct probability groups. The essential insights discussed through this Part,
however, remain true.
222. Richard Posner, Patent Trolls, BECKER-POSNER BLOG (July 21, 2013, 5:12 PM)
http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/2013/07/patent-trollsposner.html (“It is extremely difficult
to discern any possible social benefit from trolls, and extremely easy to discern substantial
social costs.”).
223. See id.
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A. An Introduction to the Practice
PAEs can manipulate shortcomings in the patent system to acquire
greater pricing power than would exist in either an atomized world or
one in which licensing takes place ex ante.224 The net effects of PAE
hold-up are almost certainly negative.225 Patentee returns exceeding the
incremental value of the claimed technology vis-à-vis its closest
substitute technology and/or non-infringing design alternative result in
overcompensation and an incentive to engage in too much patenteligible inventing.226 Simultaneously, the overcharge extracted from
downstream technology firms comes at the cost of the more important
incentive to develop and commercialize cutting-edge technologies. It
also causes prices to rise and output to drop in the downstream
market.227 Thus, there is sound reason to believe that at least some PAE
conduct degrades welfare and efficiency.
A distinct question, though, is whether competition law has anything
to say about PAE activity. Patent aggregation and ex post assertion by
NPEs may be a public policy problem, but is it an antitrust problem?
This Part concludes that, although antitrust rules are no panacea for
strategic behavior in the patent space and their application in this setting
requires treading new ground, they may be capable of addressing the
most egregious forms of PAE hold-up. Specifically, if a PAE targets a
lucrative product line, amasses and conceals individually weak patents
until the firm has brought the targeted goods to market, and then
threatens and files successive, predominantly losing lawsuits to extract
royalties disproportionate to the prices at which the PAE bought those
patents, a cause of action under the antitrust laws may exist.
A predicate for the antitrust suit is that the asset transfers giving rise
to the PAE’s ownership did not simply transfer a fixed amount of
market power. Rather, the accumulation of patents must increase market
power. In that respect, the case for antitrust condemnation for building a
patent portfolio through IPR acquisitions is inversely related to the
strength of the patents in the portfolio. As Part II explained, collecting
and enforcing almost-certainly-valid and infringing patents creates little
new market power—such actions simply transfer a monopoly from one
entity to another. While a PAE could use such IPRs to hold up
downstream innovators, the greater than ex ante royalties available flow
from flaws in the patent system and could be equally taken advantage of
by the original patentee or an assignee. By contrast, when a PAE
224. See supra Part II.
225. See supra Subsection II.A.3.c.
226. See generally Nicholas P. Chan, Comment, Balancing Judicial Misvaluation and
Patent Hold-Up: Some Principles for Considering Injunctive Relief After eBay, 59 UCLA L.
REV. 746, 763–69 (2012) (explaining the dangers of patentee overcompensation).
227. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
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strategically collects predominantly weak patents to create a hold-up
threat, it seizes otherwise nonexistent monopoly power.228 It would
seem that at least some aggregation in the PAE space is of the latter
variety.229 Strong public policy grounds exist for limiting PAE
accumulation and assertion of weak IPRs.230 But can antitrust perform
this limiting function?
Some practices would raise concerns under traditional antitrust
principles and are not the focus of this Article. For instance, if two
competitors in a downstream product market conspire to raise their
mutual rivals’ costs by assigning their patents to a PAE that can sue on
their behalf without fear of countersuit, it would likely violate Section 1
of the Sherman Act.231 Separately, in a traditional technology-licensing
market comprised of substitute patents that perform the same function,
albeit in distinct and nonoverlapping ways, a PAE that acquired all of
those patents would eliminate competition and monopolize that market
under Section 2, absent countervailing efficiency gains.232 Additionally,
some courts have held that the holder of a standard-essential patent
(SEP) can monopolize a technology-licensing market by reneging on or
strategically avoiding a commitment to license on FRAND (fair,
reasonable, and nondiscriminatory) terms, thus inducing a standardsetting organization (SSO) to adopt its proprietary technology.233
Should an SSO member/SEP-holder strategically conceal its patent in
concert with a PAE, assigning that SEP to the PAE to hold up
228. See Scott Morton & Shapiro, supra note 28, at 470 (“Mass aggregation of related but
weak patents may thus allow the PAE to achieve a rather novel type of scale economy.”).
229. See, e.g., William Thomashower, Means to Control the Patent Trolls, COMPUTER &
INTERNET LAW., Dec. 2013, at 1, 2 (quoting Committee Chairman Bob Goodlatte during the “Abusive
Patent Litigation” hearing who said that “PAEs . . . often times acquire weak or poorly-granted
patents”); Jay Levine, FTC Study on “Patent Troll” Behavior: Innovation Enhancers or Competition
Killers? Part 2, TECH. LAW SOURCE (Oct. 14, 2013), http://www.technologylawsource.com/2013/10/ar
ticles/intellectual-property-1/ftc-study-on-patent-troll-behavior-innovation-enhancers-or-competition-kill
ers-part-2/ (discussing the use of weak patents).
230. See, e.g., Erik N. Hovenkamp, Predatory Patent Litigation: How Patent Assertion
Entities Use Reputation to Monetize Bad Patents (Aug. 5, 2013) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2308115 (discussing the
manner in which predatory patent litigation by PAEs hinders innovation and promotes
questionable patenting).
231. See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2232 (2013) (citing United
States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174 (1963)) (discussing how a conspiracy to exclude a
mutual competitor can violate the Sherman Act); see also IP LICENSING GUIDELINES, supra note
116, at 25 ex. 9.
232. See, e.g., IP LICENSING GUIDELINES, supra note 116, at 8 & ex. 2.
233. See Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm, Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 314 (3d Cir. 2007); see also
Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 11-CV-01846, 2012 WL 1672493, at *4–8 (N.D. Cal.
May 14, 2012); cf. Rambus Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 522 F.3d 456, 468–69 (D.C. Cir. 2008)
(noting the antitrust concerns present where patent disclosure policies require competitors to
disclose trade secrets).
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implementers of a standard after the fact, the PAE’s actions could
violate Sections 1–2 of the Sherman Act if the other elements of those
causes of action were satisfied.234
This Article instead considers whether mass-scale aggregation of
non-substitute but related patents can violate the antitrust laws within
existing precedent.235 It begins by analyzing whether Section 2 of the
Sherman Act condemns such accumulation. It concludes by considering
whether a PAE’s patent aggregation involves asset acquisitions that tend
to create a monopoly or substantially limit competition in contravention
of Section 7 of the Clayton Act. Additionally, this Article explains how
a victim of PAE hold-up might best articulate these theories and
addresses the major challenges to prevailing on these claims.
B. Aggregating Complementary IPRs as a Section 2 Violation
Section 2 of the Sherman Act has multiple provisions, including
conspiracy and attempt, which may be relevant to firms that challenge
various forms of PAE conduct. This Article focuses, however, on actual
monopolization. A firm violates Section 2 in that manner when it
willfully acquires monopoly power other than by means “of a superior
product, business acumen, or historic accident.”236 To show that PAE
patent accumulation violates this provision, a company would have to
prove that (i) a relevant market exists; (ii) the PAE possesses monopoly
power in that market; and (iii) the PAE willfully acquired that power
through anticompetitive, exclusionary, or otherwise improper means.237
234. Courts have not yet addressed this question.
235. Until September 2014, only one case had analyzed whether a PAE’s aggregation of
patents violated antitrust law, and it had answered that question negatively. See Intellectual
Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Fin. Corp., No. 1:13-cv-00740, 2013 WL 6682981, at *1, *8
(E.D. Va. Dec. 18, 2013). This author appeared on behalf of Capital One in that case. This
Article does not address that decision but instead focuses on analyzing the antitrust issues
implicated by PAE patent accumulation from the perspective of precedential law. As noted
below, however, two federal courts have since ordered discovery on monopolization allegations
against a PAE for patent aggregation and concealment. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital
One Fin. Corp., No. 14-cv-00111-PWG, 2015 WL 898146, at *6–16 (D. Md. Mar. 2, 2015);
Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., No. 13-440-LPS, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
134255, at *13–14 (D. Del. Sept. 24, 2014). Some respected commentators suggest that the
Eastern District of Virginia may have erred in dismissing Capital One’s antitrust claims. See
Michelle D. Miller & Janusz A. Ordover, Intellectual Ventures v. Capital One: Can Antitrust
Law and Economics Get Us Past the Trolls?, CPI ANTITRUST CHRON., Jan. 29 2015, at 6,
available at https://www.wilmerhale.com/uploadedFiles/Shared_Content/Editorial/Publications/
Documents/intellectual-ventures-v-capital-one.pdf.
236. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966); see also United States
v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945) (noting that a firm can lawfully
acquire monopoly power through “superior skill, foresight and industry”).
237. See Grinnell, 384 U.S. at 570–71; Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V.
Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407 (2004) (“To safeguard the incentive to innovate, the possession
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Importantly, an antitrust plaintiff would have to overcome three
obstacles. Those challenges, however, are surmountable. Indeed, as this
Article was going to print, two federal district courts recognized that a
PAE may monopolize a technology market in aggregating and
concealing patents to achieve monopoly power.238 The first obstacle is
that a plaintiff would have to show that it is anticompetitive to amass
patents that are related by virtue of being arguably relevant to a
particular product line or industry. Since the owners of such IPRs do not
necessarily compete with one another in the conventional sense, a PAE
could argue that its acquisitions do not eliminate any competition and
thus cannot be exclusionary as a matter of law. Second, a plaintiff
would have to show that any monopoly power enjoyed by a PAE is not
inherent in the patent grant. Because a valid patent grants its owner a
lawful right to exclude,239 a plaintiff may have to demonstrate that a
PAE’s market power exceeds the total power of the individual IPRs in
the challenged portfolio. Third, a party challenging a PAE’s lawsuit
under Section 2 may have to overcome the Noerr–Pennington doctrine,
which immunizes certain conduct—even anticompetitive conduct—
founded on petitioning the government.240 This Article shows that these
challenges do not foreclose plausible antitrust claims.
1. A PAE’s Patent Portfolio as the Relevant Market
In traditional cases challenging IPR accumulation, the plaintiffs
compete in a product market with the patent aggregator.241 They
typically allege that the aggregator has a dominant position and is
acquiring so many patents that it will monopolize the downstream
market.242 In such a setting, the relevant market is a conventional
product market comprised of those goods that are reasonably
of monopoly power will not be found unlawful unless it is accompanied by an element of
anticompetitive conduct.” (emphasis omitted)).
238. See Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Fin. Corp., No. 14-cv-00111-PWG,
2015 WL 898146, at *6–16 (D. Md. Mar. 2, 2015) (Intellectual Ventures, a PAE, plausibly
violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act and Section 7 of the Clayton Act in aggregating and
concealing 3,500 financial-services patents); Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp.,
No. 13-440-LPS, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134255, at *13–14 (D. Del. Sept. 24, 2014) (finding
that allegations of targeted patent aggregation sufficiently stated an affirmative defense of patent
misuse founded on monopolization). Generally, courts may have overemphasized the
importance of patent protection to antitrust analysis—a trend that the Supreme Court in Actavis
may have reversed. See generally Robin Feldman, Ending Patent Exceptionalism and
Structuring the Rule of Reason: The Supreme Court Opens the Door for Both, 15 MINN. J.L. SCI.
& TECH. 61 (2014) (discussing the concept of “patent exceptionalism and explain[ing] how the
Supreme Court decision in Actavis moves away from it”).
239. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2012).
240. Infra Subsection III.B.4.
241. See, e.g., Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 267 (2d Cir. 1979).
242. See, e.g., id. at 267–68.
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interchangeable in consumers’ eyes.243 The courts then scrutinize the
impugned patent acquisitions’ downstream effects on price and
output.244
That approach is wrong with respect to PAEs, which by definition do
not compete in downstream product markets. Indeed, “a firm cannot
monopolize a market in which it does not compete.”245 The role of
market definition is to focus analysis on the economic milieu in which a
challenged restraint takes place. Because PAEs operate exclusively in
upstream technology markets, the focus must lie upstream.
However, market definition may not be a fruitful line of inquiry in
the ex post technology-licensing space. When lock-in has occurred,
previously available substitutes become unavailable, meaning that the
only remaining market is one of unlicensed technology.246 No
competition takes place; therefore, inferences from any market share
have limited meaning. Traditional market definition identifies the
universe of substitutes, thus allowing the factfinder to measure the
defendant’s share of that space and infer the firm’s market power. In the
ex post space, however, market share is not always as meaningful. To
see the conceptual difficulties of market definition in this space,
suppose that a product implicated 10,000 discrete proprietary
technologies and 100 of them were minimally adequate to create a holdup threat sufficient to extract greater than ex ante royalties. In an
atomized world, no one patent would occupy its own market, but an
aggregator might create an ex post market by acquiring 1000 of those
IPRs. Yet, it would possess only 10% of the relevant patents reading on
the accused device—far less than the market share typically required for
proof of monopolization. Worse still, the accumulator could divide its
portfolio by ten, keeping one share for itself and selling the others to
nine different companies. Consequently, ten markets would exist where
previously there was one.
Although market definition is the traditional starting point for
monopolization analysis under Section 2, it may not be the best starting
point in this setting. Instead, the proper focus might be on whether
monopoly power exists, and, if so, whether that power exceeds the
combined powers of the constituent patents in the portfolio. Some
courts have recognized that one can forego market definition when

243. See, e.g., id. at 269.
244. See id. at 272.
245. See, e.g., Discon, Inc. v. Nynex Corp., 93 F.3d 1055, 1062 (2d Cir. 1996), vacated,
525 U.S. 128 (1998).
246. See, e.g., Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 901, 913 (N.D. Ill. 2012)
(Posner, J., by designation), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, and vacated in part, 757 F.3d 1286 (Fed.
Cir. 2014).
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direct evidence of monopoly power is available.247 That would be the
ideal manner in which to approach the antitrust implication of PAE
patent aggregation. Nevertheless, the predominant view is that a
plaintiff must at least identify the contours of the relevant market that
the defendant allegedly monopolized.248 Thus, some exploration of the
relevant market will likely be necessary. The question, then, is what the
relevant market is for PAE conduct of the kind scrutinized in Part II.
One approach is to define each discrete licensing market comprised
of substitute technologies. Referring back to Part II’s hypothetical, this
approach would identify 4000 different markets. Nine hundred of them
would be competitive with two interchangeable patents claiming
equivalent but different methods of performing a particular function.
For the remaining 3100 markets, each of the 3100 patentees would have
100% market share in its own market, though ex ante only the 100 Tier
A patentees would have monopoly power due to Alpha’s design-around
options. Construed in this way, many relevant markets exist in which to
analyze a PAE’s targeted patent aggregation. To undertake the requisite
antitrust analysis, a court would have to focus on the competitive effects
within each market, ignoring externalities. This approach would suggest
that anticompetitive consequences could ensue only with respect to the
900 technology markets subject to competitive choice because the
remaining 3100 markets are and remain monopolized.
This methodology fails to encapsulate the full universe of
competitive effects relevant to the analysis. It incorrectly suggests that
each individual patent-licensing market comprised of substitute
technologies is economically independent of other markets, when in
reality those markets are closely interconnected and affect each other in
ways that matter to the market effects of patentee behavior. For
instance, combining many weak, non-substitute patents can dramatically
increase the price of all of them. One can only account for this effect by
adopting a broader market definition. Thus, it cannot be a correct
market definition for analyzing PAE patent aggregation. An appropriate
methodology must reflect the fact that the PAE targets downstream
innovators’ products and that the aggregated patents, though not
substitutes, are related in their potential application to those products.
The best approach—or perhaps the least imperfect one—is to define
the relevant market as the portfolio that the PAE has constructed
through its patent-acquisition campaign.249 This definition reflects the
247. See, e.g., Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 307 n.3 (3d Cir. 2007)
(“[D]irect proof of monopoly power does not require a definition of the relevant market.”).
248. See, e.g., Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 459 (1993); Republic
Tobacco Co. v. N. Atl. Trading Co., 381 F.3d 717, 737 (7th Cir. 2004).
249. Illustratively, in 1979, the Supreme Court observed that a blanket license to a
copyright aggregator’s portfolio “is, to some extent, a different product” than licenses to “the
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Supreme Court’s instruction that consumer choice and commercial
realities dictate the contours of the relevant market.250 When a PAE
builds an inescapable portfolio to hold up a given downstream firm, that
firm has no choice in licensing. No one other than the PAE can offer a
license to its portfolio. No one else can sell protection against the PAE’s
hold-up threat. These features suggest that there may be a relevant
market limited to the PAE’s portfolio.251
This market definition is imperfect because it is not stable over time.
It originates only as a result of the PAE’s acquisitions. This
characteristic may strike some economists as odd; nevertheless, it
reflects the reality in the marketplace. Intellectual Ventures, for
instance, claims that it has “create[d] a new market from scratch.”252 A
second oddity is that the relevant market is capable of giving birth to
two or more separate markets if it is large enough to be subdivided into
distinct portfolios, each capable of holding up downstream firms.
Again, that feature reflects the reality of the economic phenomena
studied in this Article.
2. Monopoly Power
To trigger scrutiny under Section 2, a PAE must either have
monopoly power or a dangerous probability of acquiring monopoly
power.253 One can prove monopoly power either directly by evidence
that the defendant controls output or prices, or indirectly by drawing
inferences based on the firm’s possession of a certain share of the
market and the presence of entry barriers and other supply-side
constraints on market power.254 Importantly, it is both a legal and

individual compositions.” Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 21–22
(1979). A very similar principle applies here.
250. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 481–82 (1992)
(“The relevant market for antitrust purposes is determined by the choices available to
[consumers]. . . . The proper market definition in this case can be determined only after a factual
inquiry into the ‘commercial realities’ faced by consumers.”).
251. See, e.g., Meredith Corp. v. SESAC, LLC, No. 09 Civ. 9177, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
24517, at *28, *31 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 2011) (holding that, although a performing-rights
organization, SESAC accounted for a relatively small percentage of all copyrighted music,
“plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that, because of the existence of SESAC songs in critical
shows and commercials (as well the alleged difficulty in determining the full contents of the
SESAC repertory), they cannot avoid music in the SESAC repertory,” so the repertory
constituted its own market); see also Broadcom, 501 F.3d at 315.
252. Invention Marketplace, INTELL. VENTURES, http://www.intellectualventures.com/
about/invention-marketplace (last visited Feb. 25, 2015).
253. Spectrum Sports, 506 U.S. at 456; see also United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S.
563, 570–71 (1966).
254. See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 51 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
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economic mistake to infer monopoly power from the ownership of IPRs
alone.255
Beginning with the inferential approach, one might observe that a
PAE that has amassed a sufficiently large portfolio to create a hold-up
threat accounts for all sales of licenses to IPRs in its portfolio. From that
perspective, it would possess 100% of the market.256 Even a firm with
100% market share can lack monopoly power if entry barriers are
absent.257 In this setting, however, the PAE exercises unfettered control
over the licensing of the patents in its portfolio. Even if a determined
entrant were to purchase a subset of the PAE’s patents, a large universe
of unenforced IPRs remains available for the PAE to acquire to bolster
its portfolio.258 Ultimately, if a PAE has constructed an offensive patent
portfolio to hold up downstream targets, the only limitation on the
PAE’s monopoly power is the cost that it can credibly threaten to inflict
on the target through repeated litigation.
Therefore, if a PAE aggregates weak patents to eliminate choice and
thus impose an inescapable threat on downstream innovators, direct
evidence of monopoly power should exist. Discovery into the sum of
the prices that the aggregator paid for the IPRs in its portfolio, the terms
on which prior licensing, if any, by the assignor took place, and internal
projections and cost-benefit assessments of acquired patents would shed
light on the power that the aggregation realized. Differences between
the net price that a PAE paid for its IPRs and the price at which the PAE
sells those rights—if substantial—would indicate acquisition of
otherwise absent monopoly power, and scale efficiencies in litigation
alone would not plausibly explain them.
3. Exclusionary Conduct
Once a firm possesses monopoly power in a relevant market, the
remaining question is whether the defendant willfully acquired that

255. See Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 43 n.4 (2006).
256. Some courts have concluded that possessing nearly 100% of the market is strong
evidence of monopoly power. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451,
452 (1992) (concluding that controlling 80% to 95% market share is sufficient evidence of
monopoly power to survive summary judgment); Meredith Corp., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
24517, at *48 (“Here, where SESAC holds nearly 100% of the relevant market, it is clear that
they have established monopoly power.”).
257. See, e.g., United States v. Syufy Enters., 903 F.2d 659, 664 (9th Cir. 1990).
258. One might argue that the right market definition should account for the larger universe
of IPRs available to the PAE to bolster its portfolio. Nevertheless, one can fruitfully analyze this
consideration outside the confines of market definition, as the law typically does with respect to
supply-side substitution (entry), which is a critical determinant of monopoly power not usually
considered in defining the market. See Heerwagen v. Clear Channel Commc’ns, 435 F.3d 219,
227 (2d Cir. 2006) (discussing the measure of a market’s geographic scope).
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position.259 This last step does not inexorably follow from the existence
of dominance, and the Supreme Court has cautioned that “[t]he mere
possession of monopoly power, and the concomitant charging of
monopoly prices, is not only not unlawful; it is an important element of
the free-market system.”260 The question is whether the firm achieved
its dominant position in a procompetitive manner, thus promoting the
goals that the Court has identified as justifying supracompetitive
pricing. Specifically, “[t]he opportunity to charge monopoly prices—at
least for a short period—is what attracts ‘business acumen’ in the first
place; it induces risk taking that produces innovation and economic
growth.”261 Thus, dominance acquired pursuant to innovation or
efficiency is not only lawful; it is laudable.262 Conversely, when a firm
acquires such power through anticompetitive conduct—not through “a
superior product, business acumen, or historic accident”263—
condemnation properly follows.
a. Analyzing PAE Aggregation and Hold-Up Under the Rule of
Reason
Section 2 usually involves a rule-of-reason-type analysis where a
plaintiff must first demonstrate that the accused firm’s conduct carries
anticompetitive effect, thus harming consumers and not merely injuring
competitors.264 If the complainant thus establishes a prima facie case,
then “the monopolist [must] assert[] a procompetitive justification—a
nonpretextual claim that its conduct is indeed a form of competition on
the merits because it involves, for example, greater efficiency or
enhanced consumer appeal.”265 In that event, the burden shifts back to
the plaintiff to establish that the conduct’s net effect is
anticompetitive.266 In weighing procompetitive and anticompetitive
effects, courts focus “upon the effect of that conduct, not upon the intent
behind it.”267
259. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966).
260. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407
(2004).
261. Id.
262. See, e.g., Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 281 (2d Cir. 1979)
(observing that because “a monopolist is permitted, and indeed encouraged, by § 2 to compete
aggressively on the merits, any success that it may achieve through ‘the process of invention and
innovation’ is clearly tolerated” (quoting United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F.
Supp. 295, 344 (D. Mass. 1953)).
263. Grinnell, 384 U.S. at 570–71.
264. See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58–59 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
265. Id. at 59.
266. Id.
267. Id. That law does not make intent irrelevant, of course, to a Section 2 claim. See, e.g.,
Times-Picayune Publ’g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 626 (1953).
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In targeting existing lucrative products, not practicing any
technology, and amassing weak patents to the point that its portfolio
poses an outsize threat, a PAE can acquire market power exceeding the
total power of the constituent patents when disaggregated. This
monopoly-power-producing conduct is intentional and involves neither
business acumen nor a superior product. The conduct at issue is a
classic form of strategic hold-up.268 It inflates IPR royalties above their
appropriate ex ante benchmark levels, causing upstream patentee
overcompensation, excessive taxation of independent downstream
innovation, and increased prices, while reducing output in downstream
product markets. These are classic anticompetitive effects.269 Subject to
complications discussed below, these effects, if demonstrated through a
developed record, should establish a prima facie case under Section 2.
A PAE would almost certainly proffer a procompetitive justification
of facilitating a more liquid market for the monetization of IPRs, thus
rewarding patentees and diminishing free-riding. This defense should
not be immediately dismissed. As noted above, patent aggregation is not
devoid of merit and, in some circumstances, can enhance welfare. In
achieving litigation-scale economies, a PAE can provide a return for
some upstream patentees for whom the cost of assertion, rather than the
weaknesses of their IPRs, caused suboptimal rates of assertion.
This justification, however, will not suffice when a PAE combines
weak patents ex post to achieve otherwise absent monopoly power.
When the patent accumulation does not result in the dispersal of
licenses to strong patents that are valid and infringed, and which are
hence essential inputs in the downstream commercialization process,
but instead creates a hold-up threat using patents that would not and
should not have been asserted on account of their low quality, the
welfare losses triggered by PAE aggregation and assertion swamp any
countervailing benefits.
This conclusion follows for at least three reasons. First, PAEs do not
engage in a zero-sum transfer. Every dollar lost by a downstream
technology company to a PAE is not a dollar gained by an upstream
patentee. The PAE acts as a monopolistic gateway, securing the
majority of the wealth it extracts for its own purposes and sharing
merely a fraction with upstream patentees. Money fueling hold-up
rather than rewarding inventors of novel, useful, and nonobvious
inventions will not promote social welfare. Even if upstream incentives
268. Courts have held that certain forms of hold-up in the patent setting resulting in
monopoly power in a technology-licensing market constitute actionable anticompetitive
behavior. See, e.g., Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 315 (3d Cir. 2007); see
also Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs., No. 11-CV-01846, 2012 WL 1672493, at *4–8 (N.D. Cal.
May 14, 2012).
269. See, e.g., Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339 (1979).
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to obtain patents were as important as downstream incentives to
innovate, PAE royalty extractions reduce the latter more than they
promote the former.
Second, from the perspective of social welfare, what matters most is
not a notional technology disclosed in a document but the realization of
that technology in a consumable form. A major problem with PAE
activity is that, to the extent it generates licensing revenue that flows
into the hands of upstream patentees, it magnifies incentives to patent
but not to commercialize. Developing a technology from the conceptual
stage to realization is often investment-heavy and risky. To promote
social welfare, the right incentive is one to develop and market
technology. PAE conduct suppresses that incentive.
Third, even if a PAE’s behavior carried some procompetitive
benefit, the harms that it inflicts on innovation incentives are greater
than those necessary to achieve that benefit. Particularly, PAEs could
provide licensing convenience without undermining price competition
by acquiring nonexclusive licenses rather than assignments from
upstream patentees. Doing so would allow downstream innovators
confronted with excessive prices to negotiate potentially lower prices
with the upstream patentees, thus limiting the patent aggregator’s
monopoly power. Interestingly, the Supreme Court has weighed in on
this scenario. In 1979, the Court held that two copyright aggregators,
ASCAP and BMI, did not commit a per se antitrust violation in
amassing and licensing thousands of copyrighted musical works
because consent decrees entered into with the Justice Department
ensured that licensees enjoyed “a real choice.”270 Specifically, they
could negotiate direct licenses from the aggregators’ affiliates.271 PAE
aggregation, by contrast, entails no such right. By acquiring outright
ownership and exclusive licensing authority over a large patent portfolio
targeting a lucrative firm’s business or product, PAEs suffocate the
escape-valve of direct licensing that the Supreme Court emphasized
“must not be ignored” when analyzing antitrust principles.272
These combined effects suggest that a PAE that achieves monopoly
power by aggregating weak patents and licensing them under threat of
recurring suit causes net anticompetitive effects.
b. Can Patent Aggregation Constitute Exclusionary Conduct?
A threshold issue is whether patent accumulation can constitute
anticompetitive behavior under Section 2. The little law that exists on
this question pours cold water on bold claims that IPR accumulation
270. Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 10–11, 24 (1979).
271. See id. at 11, 24.
272. See, e.g., id. at 24.
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naturally lends itself to monopolization. The Supreme Court declared in
1950 that the “mere accumulation of patents, no matter how many, is
not in and of itself illegal.”273
Generally, patent aggregation is desirable in many scenarios;
therefore, an overarching prohibition would be mistaken.274 Automatic
Radio Manufacturing Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc. merely holds that
IPR accumulation is not per se illegal. In any event, the theory of harm
pertaining to PAE aggregation articulated in this Article does not simply
rely on the sheer number of patents involved. The relationship among
the patents infuses the accumulation with anticompetitive effect.
Targeting a product comprised of thousands of discrete technological
components and then amassing weak patents arguably reading on
distinct elements of that good creates monopoly power in much the
same way as—and, in some circumstances, even more effectively
than—eliminating available substitutes reading on one component.
Indeed, the ex post character of the challenged acquisition and assertion
is a key element of PAE’s anticompetitive hold-up.275
IPR aggregation can be unlawful. “Patent acquisitions are not
immune from the antitrust laws.”276 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit observed that “a patent holder may run afoul of the
antitrust laws” by “expand[ing] [its] monopoly by misuse, agreement, or
accumulation.”277 Perhaps most intriguingly, in its “no matter how
many” pronouncement, the Supreme Court highlighted that the record
before it did not support “charges that respondent uses its accumulation
of patents ‘for the exaction of tribute’ and collects royalties ‘by means

273. Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827, 834 (1950),
overruled on other grounds by Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 89 S. Ct. 1902 (1969) (overuling
Hazeltine’s rule regarding the estoppel doctrine).
274. See supra Subsection II.A.3.b.
275. Cf. SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1205 (2d Cir. 1981) (supposing that a
dominant firm’s acquisition of a patent targeting a competitor’s existing products would
“[s]urely” violate § 2 because “in such a case the patented invention already has been
commercialized successfully, and the magnitude of the transgression of the antitrust laws’
proscription against willful aggregations of market power outweighs substantially the negative
effect that the elimination of that class of purchasers for commercialized patents places upon the
patent system”).
276. Id.; see also 3 PHILIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN
ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 704b, at 160 (2d ed. 2002)
(“[W]hether accomplished by internal development or by acquisition, one firm’s aggregation of
numerous patents, even less significant ones, can impair actual and potential competition.”).
277. United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 648 F.2d 642, 647 (9th Cir. 1981); see
also In re Xerox Corp., No. 8909, 1975 WL 173245 ¶ 14(c), at *3 (F.T.C. July 29, 1975)
(finding Xerox’s patent aggregation harmful to competition and specifically objecting to its
“developing and maintaining a patent structure of great size, complexity, and obscurity of
boundaries”), modified, 1982 WL 608326 (F.T.C. Sept. 10, 1982).
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of the overpowering threat of disastrous litigation.’”278 One wonders
what the Court would make of mass-scale aggregation of the kind
analyzed here if it had occasion to scrutinize a developed record of the
practice. The Court’s phraseology seems tailored to describe the PAE
business model.
Circuit-level precedent on point is lacking because even though the
PAE phenomenon is not itself new,279 its current scale and harm to the
U.S. economy certainly are. Nevertheless, three fruitful avenues exist to
explore whether PAE patent aggregation might amount to actionable
anticompetitive conduct in violation of Section 2.
First, the Supreme Court’s leading pronouncement on the law of
monopolization holds that the “willful acquisition” of monopoly power
is illegal except in three cases where the events responsible for
generating that power are either independently salutary or not the doing
of the monopolist.280 Therefore, it is not clear that only monopoly power
acquired through the elimination of substitutes is actionable.281 To the
contrary, it is incumbent on a firm strategically securing otherwise
nonexistent monopoly power that harms consumers to show that its
behavior carries procompetitive justifications.282 For reasons explored
in Part II, a PAE achieving hold-up power by aggregating weak patents
could not make such a showing.
Expanding on this point, it makes little sense to speak of eliminating
“competition” in the ex post world where PAEs operate. Irreversible
investment in a product line obviates substitute technologies that were
once viable alternatives to the technical solutions that the innovator
ultimately chose to adopt. By waiting until lock-in occurs, a PAE
ensures that sunk capital expenditures remove prior competitive
constraints. In the ex post world, competition consists of IPR holders
striving for the greatest possible share of the profit stream generated by
the infringing device. Like competition to obtain a monopoly, this can
be socially inefficient, specifically when it results in hold-up payments
278. Hazeltine, 339 U.S. at 834.
279. Some say that the first patent troll was George B. Selden, who engaged in submarine
patenting by sitting on his patent application for sixteen years until he thought the patent was most
valuable, at which point he patented the automobile concept and later sold the patent to a financer who
sued the Ford Motor Company. See Richard Snow, The Father of All Patent Trolls, FORBES
(July 30, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/forbesleadershipforum/2013/07/30/the-father-ofall-patent-trolls/. However, the Ford Motor Company eventually prevailed. Id.
280. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966) (finding “a superior
product, business acumen, or historic accident” to be justifications for attainment or preservation
of market dominance).
281. See generally Mark S. Popofsky, Defining Exclusionary Conduct: Section 2, the Rule
of Reason, and the Unifying Principle Underlying Antitrust Rules, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 435
(2006) (espousing the view that monopolization standards should and do flex in light of the
distinct nature of the conduct challenged in a particular case).
282. See supra notes 264–65.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2016

65

Florida Law Review, Vol. 67, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 15

840

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67

exceeding the ex ante benchmark. PAEs compound this inefficiency.
They seize monopoly power not by eliminating substitutes but by
magnifying hold-up founded on lock-in. PAEs’ strategic patent
aggregation seeks to remove constraints on monopoly power that exist
ex post, thus generating otherwise absent monopoly power. Such
monopolization has powerful anticompetitive effects. PAEs are not the
rare species of business that operates in an antitrust-free zone with
freedom to acquire monopoly power and inflict serious losses on
consumers without limitation.
Second, exploring the few circuit decisions addressing patent
acquisitions by operating companies can explain whether acquiring and
asserting IPRs can itself be anticompetitive. If the effects of amassing
patents dictate the outcome, then there is no categorical rule that IPR
aggregation is always or never anticompetitive. Consequently, one can
legitimately tie a PAE’s patent accumulation to the monopoly power
that follows and condemn it on that basis. In other words, if IPR
aggregation is just a form of commercial conduct like many others—
often benign, sometimes beneficial, and occasionally anticompetitive—
then all that remains in scrutinizing PAE aggregation under Section 2 is
to judge the conduct by its effects alone. Again, any such analysis is
most unlikely to be favorable to a PAE engaging in ex post hold-up
using weak patents.
Some famous cases illuminate this discussion. In Kobe, Inc. v.
Dempsey Pump Co.,283 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
addressed a situation in which a firm targeted a market for hydraulic
pumps used in deep oil wells.284 The firm acquired as many patents
reading on those pumps as it could, licensed them on the condition that
the licensees not compete with it, brought infringement actions, and
publicized its enforcement campaign.285 The Tenth Circuit affirmed a
Section 2 violation, holding that the aggregation and assertion of
patents, some of which were valid and infringed, constituted actionable
exclusionary conduct.286
Kobe’s context was distinct from that explored in this Article. PAEs
do not compete in downstream product markets; thus, they do not direct
their infringement actions against horizontal competitors. But that is an
inconsequential distinction. An antitrust objection to PAE conduct goes
not to a downstream product market but to an upstream technologylicensing market. The sole question presently of interest is whether
patent aggregation and assertion may be exclusionary behavior under

283.
284.
285.
286.

198 F.2d 416 (10th Cir. 1952).
Id. at 418.
See id. at 419–22.
See id. at 418, 425, 427, 430.
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Section 2. Kobe says yes.287 The Chief Judge of the District of Delaware
found likewise in 2014, holding that Intellectual Ventures’ alleged
aggregation and concealment of patents required discovery to determine
whether they constituted patent misuse due to monopolization.288
In United States v. Singer Manufacturing Co.,289 the Supreme Court
condemned manufacturers of household zigzag sewing machines for
assigning their patents to the conspirator in the best position to enforce
the patents against their mutual rivals.290 The Court noted that it would
be one thing for a firm to acquire patents to protect its own product, but
another thing altogether to do so for the benefit of its coconspirators.291
Observing that “[b]y aggregating patents in one control, the holder of
the patents cannot escape the prohibitions of the Sherman Act,” the
Supreme Court held that the agreed acquisition and enforcement of
patents violated Section 1.292
Again, the facts in Singer are distinct from those surrounding PAE
hold-up, which does not generally involve horizontal rivals in a product
market conspiring to exclude their mutual competitors. That is merely to
say that Singer was a Section 1 case, while the strategic patent
aggregation considered here attracts Section 2. The question is not
whether Singer is on all fours with the practices under scrutiny here but
whether the decision sheds light on whether patent aggregation that
does not eliminate competition between substitute patents may
nevertheless be exclusionary for the purposes of Section 2. Singer
answers this question in the affirmative. Importantly, the
anticompetitive effect was not that the arrangement eliminated
substitute-licensing opportunities for the nonconspiring sewing machine
producers. Rather, it was that the agreement increased the likelihood
and scale of IPR enforcement. Singer was better able to assert IPRs than
its foreign coconspirators so the patent threat faced by the
nonconspirators was greater when the patents were combined under its
control rather than dissipated among many patentees whose
enforcement efforts would be less effective.

287. Id.; see also In re Great Lakes Chem. Corp., No. 9155, 1984 WL 565323 ¶ 29(a)–(f),
at *4 (F.T.C. May 23, 1984) (concluding that “[t]he effect of [a] proposed acquisition may be
substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly” in the relevant market).
288. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., No. 13-440-LPS, 2014 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 134255, at *13–14 (D. Del. Sept. 24, 2014) (discussing Kobe, 198 F.2d 416).
289. 374 U.S. 174 (1963).
290. Id. at 193–95.
291. Id. at 194.
292. Id. at 197 (quoting United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 308 (1948)).
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c. Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis, Inc.
Ultimately, the most important decision governing whether and how
to subject PAE aggregation to scrutiny under the antitrust laws is the
Supreme Court’s decision in Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis,
Inc.293 Actavis fundamentally altered U.S. law governing the
relationship between patents and antitrust. At first blush, the subject
matter of that opinion seems esoteric, concerning pay-for-delay
arrangements in which a patent-owning pharmaceutical company pays a
generic-drug producer seeking to enter its market to stay out and not
challenge the patent.294 That may appear to be leagues apart from
strategic patent aggregation by PAEs. Upon closer examination,
however, the parallels are close, and the Court’s espoused principles in
Actavis suggest the answer in the PAE setting as well.
Actavis held that reverse exclusionary payments are subject to the
rule of reason and suggested that they will fail to withstand that scrutiny
where the sums paid in settlement exceed the probable litigation costs
thus avoided.295 To reach this decision, the Court had to look past the
fact that any anticompetitive effect attendant upon the pay-for-delay
agreement fell within the scope of a presumptively valid patent.296
Traditionally, antitrust was understood to patrol the borders of a patent’s
scope, but it had no bearing on anticompetitive effects lying within the
patent’s claims. The Supreme Court once said that a patent was “an
exception to the general rule against monopolies and to the right to
access to a free and open market.”297
In contrast, Actavis holds that “patent and antitrust policies are both
relevant in determining the ‘scope of the patent monopoly’—and
consequently antitrust law immunity—that is conferred by a patent.”298
From now on, an inquiry into whether a restraint “‘fall[s] within’ the
legitimate ‘scope’ of the patent’s ‘exclusionary potential’” does not
control the outcome. 299 Rather, one answers “the antitrust question by
considering traditional antitrust factors such as likely anticompetitive
effects, redeeming virtues, market power, and potentially offsetting
legal considerations present in the circumstances, such as . . . those
related to patents.”300
293. 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013).
294. Id. at 2227, 2229.
295. See id. at 2236–37.
296. See id. at 2234.
297. Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 343 (1971) (quoting
Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 816 (1945)).
298. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2231.
299. Id. (quoting Fed. Trade Comm’n. v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1309, 1312
(11th Cir. 2012), rev’d sub nom. Federal Trade Comm’n v. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 2223).
300. Id.
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Actavis clarified that conduct tending to secure patents against
invalidation carries anticompetitive effects. Since patents carry
probabilistic rights to exclude only, it is not their “exclusionary
potential” that matters but their “actual preclusive scope.”301 The Court
emphasized that “the patent-related policy of eliminating unwarranted
patent grants so the public will not ‘continually be required to pay
tribute to would-be monopolists without need or justification.’”302
Consequently, a restraint is anticompetitive if it bolsters an invalid
patent because “‘the public interest in granting patent monopolies’
exists only to the extent that ‘the public is given a novel and useful
invention’ in ‘consideration for its grant.’”303
These observations shed much light on PAE aggregation. As
explained above, that practice is most problematic from an antitrust
policy standpoint when it facilitates hold-up by using patents that are
likely invalid or not infringed. Certain PAEs engage in mass-scale
aggregation that transforms IPRs that are individually of nugatory value
into a collective whole that is impervious to invalidation and allows the
patent aggregator to extract tens or even hundreds of millions of dollars
in licensing fees. Not even the richest technology company can afford to
litigate thousands of patents in a portfolio to demonstrate that all or
almost all were improvidently granted. Forcing licensees to pay large
royalties for invalid patents runs contrary to both the patent and antitrust
policies emphasized in Actavis. In short, PAEs can no longer maintain
that the anticompetitive effects of their accumulation are invulnerable to
antitrust scrutiny because they fall within the “scope” of the patents.
Finally, in exploring whether PAE aggregation yields problematic
monopoly power, one must distinguish innocuous from malign forms of
patent accumulation. Even a monopolist may properly build imposing
portfolios via internal research and development and by prosecuting its
own inventions. The calculus is different, however, when reaching out
to acquire others’ IPRs to exclude existing products.304 Potential
anticompetitive effects are pronounced when a dominant firm targets its
competitors’ existing goods and purchases IPRs that arguably read on
them.305
In none of these situations is patent aggregation inherently
anticompetitive—its effects depend on the competitive dynamics of the
301. Id. at 2230–31 (quoting Watson Pharm., 677 F.3d at 1312).
302. Id. at 2233 (quoting Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 670 (1969)).
303. Id. at 2232 (quoting United States v. Singer Mfg. Co, 374 U.S. 174, 199 (1963)
(White, J., concurring)).
304. SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1205 (2d Cir. 1981) (“Surely, a § 2
violation will have occurred where . . . the dominant competitor in a market acquires a patent
covering a substantial share of the same market that he knows when added to his existing share
will afford him monopoly power.”).
305. Id.
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industry in which the IPR acquisitions take place. Modern technology
markets invite many situations in which patent accumulation facilitates
commercialization of technology. The so-called Rockstar Consortium of
Apple, Microsoft, BlackBerry, Ericsson, and Sony outbid Google for
bankrupt Nortel’s portfolio of some 6000 “4G” telecommunications
patents in June 2011 for $4.5 billion.306 Less than a year later, Google
responded by paying $12.5 billion to acquire Motorola Mobility,
specifically Motorola’s 17,000-patent portfolio claiming wireless
technology.307 The implications of these massive acquisitions remain to
be seen, but they may result in a mutual clearing position. By contrast,
when the context surrounding patent aggregation is not one of relative
stability between downstream competitors but one of unilateral
dominance, the competitive dynamics shift.
These observations do not control the antitrust implications of
targeted PAE patent aggregation, but they are illuminative nevertheless.
Defensive patent acquisitions designed to achieve equilibrium between
similarly situated rivals are unlikely to be anticompetitive because their
aim and effect are to clear positions to market technologies downstream.
Conversely, dominant-firm acquisitions conducted for offensive reasons
and likely to produce asymmetric hold-up positions are categorically
different.
4. Noerr–Pennington Doctrine
The Noerr–Pennington doctrine impedes much antitrust scrutiny of
patentee conduct, and it poses a potential obstacle to a litigant who
wishes to demonstrate that an IP holder commits actionable
exclusionary conduct in filing lawsuits.308 In its most recent decision on
the matter, Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia
Pictures Industries, Inc.,309 the Supreme Court explained that “[t]hose
who petition government for redress are generally immune from
antitrust liability,” except when the petition “is a mere sham to
cover . . . an attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships
of a competitor.”310 As a result, the Court explained, a litigant loses
immunity only if its lawsuit was “objectively baseless in the sense that
306. Chris V. Nicholson, Apple and Microsoft Beat Google for Nortel Patents, N.Y. TIMES
(July 1, 2011, 4:58 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/07/01/apple-and-microsoft-beatgoogle-for-nortel-patents/.
307. David Goldman, Google Seals $13 Billion Motorola Buy, CNN (May 22, 2012, 10:20
AM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/05/22/technology/google-motorola/.
308. For an illuminative discussion of how Noerr–Pennington may impede antitrust
scrutiny of patentee misconduct, see Robin Feldman, Intellectual Property Wrongs, 18 STAN.
J.L. BUS. & FIN. 250, 301–05 (2013).
309. 508 U.S. 49 (1992).
310. Id. at 56 (quoting E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365
U.S. 127, 144 (1961)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol67/iss2/15

70

Devlin: Antitrust Limits on Targeted Patent Aggregation

2015]

ANTITRUST LIMITS ON TARGETED PATENT AGGREGATION

845

no reasonable litigant could realistically expect success on the merits”
and if “the baseless lawsuit conceals ‘an attempt to interfere directly
with the business relationships of a competitor’ through the ‘use [of] the
governmental process—as opposed to the outcome of that process—as
an anticompetitive weapon.’”311
As a preliminary observation, no immunity would attach where a
PAE asserts patents that are weak to the point of being objectively
baseless. In the hypothetical explored in the preceding Part, a PAE
combining and asserting Tier C patents would thus fall outside the
scope of the immunity recognized in Professional Real Estate Investors.
To make things more interesting, however, assume that the patents at
issue are of suspect validity but would nevertheless allow their owner to
surpass the Professional Real Estate Investors standard.
This doctrine should not immunize the form of PAE conduct
analyzed in this Article for several reasons. First, the anticompetitive
behavior at issue lies primarily in aggregating patents that are related in
arguably reading on distinct features of a profitable, existing product.
Private market transactions of that nature “have traditionally been
objects of antitrust scrutiny” and do not involve petitioning the
government or courts in any way.312 Thus, Noerr–Pennington immunity
does not attach to the asset acquisitions through which PAEs build their
portfolios and achieve otherwise absent monopoly power.313 The means
through which PAEs realize the power so achieved is by threat and fact
of filing a lawsuit. If that alone immunized PAE conduct, however, it
would mean that many Supreme Court and Circuit decisions
recognizing antitrust violations by patentees are wrong. When
competitors pool their patents to exclude their common rivals through
lawsuits, for example, they commit an actionable violation of Section 1
even if the patents asserted are valid and infringed.314 As in the case of
PAEs, the only way to give effect to the anticompetitive conduct is by
311. Id. at 60–61 (quoting Noerr, 365 U.S. at 144, and City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor
Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 380 (1991)) (citation omitted).
312. Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 500–01 (1988).
313. This observation has two consequences. First, Noerr–Pennington would not impede a
§ 7 challenge alleging that PAE’s acquisitions of patents. See, e.g., Gold Cross Ambulance v.
City of Kan. City, 538 F. Supp. 956, 969 (W.D. Mo. 1982), aff’d, 705 F.2d 1005 (8th Cir. 1983).
Section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits transactions, “the effect [of which] . . . may be
substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.” 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012).
Patents are “assets” for the purpose of § 7. See, e.g., United States v. Columbia Pictures Corp.,
189 F. Supp. 153, 181–83 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (recognizing IPRs as asset acquisitions under § 7).
The theory addressed in this Part would apply equally to a § 7 action, which would be more
straightforward because Noerr–Pennington immunity would not be an issue. Second, an
antitrust violation is complete before filing suit, even if filing an infringement suit were
protected.
314. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2232 (2013) (citing United
States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174 (1963)).
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filing suit. Some courts have held that a member of an SSO that either
fails to disclose or discloses but fraudulently agrees to license on
FRAND terms, and later asserts its SEP, can violate Section 2.315 Again,
the only means of holding up implementers of the standard and thus
willfully acquiring the prohibited monopoly power is by filing or
threatening to file suit. In short, a patentee cannot immunize
independently unlawful behavior simply by filing a nonobjective
baseless lawsuit.316
Noerr–Pennington ought not to apply to PAE hold-up founded on
serial patent assertion for another reason. The Professional Real Estate
Investors standard discussed above applies to a single act of filing suit.
The Supreme Court’s earlier California Motor Transportation Co. v.
Trucking Unlimited decision holds, however, that a litigant can also lose
its immunity in filing “a pattern of baseless, repetitive claims . . . [to]
produce[] an illegal result.”317 Every U.S. Circuit that has addressed the
question demonstrates that Professional Real Estate Investors did not
sub silentio overrule Trucking Unlimited.318 Consequently, a PAE that
files suit several times using weak patents should not enjoy immunity,
even if it happens to prevail on a small percentage of its claims.319 In
that situation, the PAE is not seeking reasonable royalties as to the
patents-in-suit; rather, it is using the legal process itself as a weapon to

315. See Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm, Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 315 (3d Cir. 2007); see also
Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 11-CV-01846, 2012 WL 1672493, at *4–8 (N.D. Cal.
May 14, 2012).
316. See, e.g., Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 513–14 (1972)
(“It is well settled that First Amendment rights are not immunized from regulation when they
are used as an integral part of conduct which violates a valid statute.”); Premier Elec. Constr.
Co. v. Nat’l Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 814 F.2d 358, 376 (7th Cir. 1987) (“There is no such thing
as the lawful enforcement of a private cartel. . . . The first amendment does not protect efforts to
enforce private cartels, in court or out.”); Clipper Exxpress v. Rocky Mountain Motor Tariff
Bureau, Inc., 690 F.2d 1240, 1264 (9th Cir. 1982) (“If Clipper can prove that the defendants
engaged in activities which violated the antitrust laws, those violations do not become immune
simply because the defendants used legal means . . . to enforce the violations. We find
significant support for our holding in Supreme Court and circuit court decisions.”); see also In
re Burlington N., Inc., 822 F.2d 518, 526 (5th Cir. 1987) (“Noerr-Pennington provides
immunity only for the narrow petitioning activity . . . and . . . this immunity does not provide
overall immunity to other violations.” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
317. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. at 513.
318. See Waugh Chapel S., LLC v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 27,
728 F.3d 354, 363–64 (4th Cir. 2013); USS-POSCO Indus. v. Contra Costa Cnty. Bldg. &
Constr. Trades Council, 31 F.3d 800, 810–11 (9th Cir. 1994); see also Primetime 24 Joint
Venture v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 219 F.3d 92, 100–01 (2d Cir. 2000).
319. See Waugh Chapel, 728 F.3d at 364–65; Primetime, 219 F.3d at 101; USS-POSCO, 31
F.3d at 811.
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coerce the prospective licensee into paying greater than ex ante royalties
on the much larger portfolio of patents not in litigation.320
CONCLUSION
Most commentators agree that mass patent aggregation and assertion
by PAEs are problematic.321 Public policy action now seems inevitable.
Congress may pass legislation that would significantly impede low-scale
PAE activity, and the Supreme Court in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank322 has
already narrowed the circumstances in which inventors can legitimately
patent computer-implemented technologies.323 Nevertheless, the largest
PAEs will likely continue to hold up leading innovators by amassing
hundreds or thousands of patents ostensibly reading on different
elements of a firm’s successful products and services. Accordingly, the
question is whether any other tools beyond patent reform are available
to victims of PAE hold-up. This Article argues that an antitrust
objection is at least theoretically sound.
To be sure, crafting a viable antitrust theory in this space poses
challenges. The IPRs underlying PAEs’ patent portfolios are rarely
comprised of substitute technologies that would otherwise compete with
one another in the absence of aggregation. Rather, the lion’s share of
such IPRs are economic complements, which would usually suggest
that combining such rights should enhance rather than diminish
efficiency. The Noerr–Pennington doctrine generally permits a patentee
to file nonfrivolous lawsuits. Furthermore, much patent aggregation is
procompetitive. A great deal of IPR accumulation takes place within the
economy on the part of manufacturing entities, defensive patent
aggregators, or others. A workable antitrust theory against PAEs must
lend itself to a suitable limiting principle.
These concerns are surmountable. This Article seeks to debunk those
objections by presenting a comprehensive theory of anticompetitive
effect. In doing so, it has both explained the unique economic factors
320. Some of the largest PAEs file multiple lawsuits against their targets, thus potentially
triggering the Trucking Unlimited line of cases. Intellectual Ventures, for example, has filed
multiple infringement actions against Symantec, Capital One, Canon, and others. E.g.,
Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Fin. Corp., No. 1:13-cv-00740, 2014 WL 1513273,
at *1 (E.D. Va. Apr. 16, 2014); Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Canon Inc., No. 11-792-SLR,
2014 WL 1392568, at *1 (D. Del. Apr. 10, 2014); Adrienne Kendrick, Intellectual Ventures
Brings Second Patent Infringement Lawsuit Against Symantec, IPWATCHDOG (Mar. 27, 2013,
7:45 AM), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2013/03/27/intellectual-ventures-patent-infringementlawsuit-symantec/id=37947/.
321. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 222. But see Lemley & Melamed, supra note 30; Adam Mossoff,
The Myth of the “Patent Troll” Litigation Explosion, TRUTH ON MARKET (Aug. 12, 2013),
http://truthonthemarket.com/2013/08/12/the-myth-of-the-patent-troll-litigation-explosion/.
322. 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014).
323. Id. at 2352.
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that cause the accumulation of complements to undermine efficiency
and outlined the legal principles on which an innovator might base a
monopolization claim. In the right circumstances, PAE hold-up based
on amassing weak patents should be actionable.
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